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mint_key

Agent self-serve API key issuance. An autonomous agent that has no email inbox can obtain a free-tier API key by proving it holds the MACHINE_MINT_SECRET via HMAC-SHA256. Returns a usable key immediately with no human action required. If the operator has not activated a mint secret on the server, this returns an honest not_configured failure rather than a key - call it once and branch on that before planning around it. [free, no key]

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nonceYesRandom value (UUID or hex). Prevents replay attacks — use a fresh nonce each…
agent_idYesA stable unique identifier for this agent (e.g. a UUID). The issued key is…
signatureYesHMAC-SHA256(agent_id + str(timestamp) + nonce, MACHINE_MINT_SECRET) as…
timestampYesUnix epoch seconds at signing time. Must be within 60s of server time.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / agent_id / description
      Previous value: -"A stable unique identifier for this agent (e.g. a UUID). The issued key is deterministically tied to this ID."New value: +"A stable unique identifier for this agent (e.g. a UUID). The issued key is…"
    • changedInput schema / properties / nonce / description
      Previous value: -"Random value (UUID or hex). Prevents replay attacks — use a fresh nonce each call."New value: +"Random value (UUID or hex). Prevents replay attacks — use a fresh nonce each…"
    • changedInput schema / properties / signature / description
      Previous value: -"HMAC-SHA256(agent_id + str(timestamp) + nonce, MACHINE_MINT_SECRET) as lowercase hex. The HMAC input is the raw concatenation with no separators."New value: +"HMAC-SHA256(agent_id + str(timestamp) + nonce, MACHINE_MINT_SECRET) as…"
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / nonce / description
      Previous value: -"Random value (UUID or hex). Prevents replay attacks — use a fresh nonce each call."New value: +"Random value (UUID or hex). Prevents replay attacks — use a fresh nonce each call."
  3. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / nonce / description
      Previous value: -"Random value (UUID or hex). Prevents replay attacks — use a fresh nonce each call."New value: +"Random value (UUID or hex). Prevents replay attacks — use a fresh nonce each call."
  4. Added

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only provide generic flags (readOnlyHint false, idempotentHint false, etc.) and do not explain behavior. The description adds meaningful operational details: no human action required, immediate usable key, honest not_configured failure mode, and free/no-key prerequisite. This materially helps the agent predict what will happen when it calls the tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense and front-loaded with purpose and the key decision-relevant details. Only minor redundancy exists, such as repeating 'free-tier' and '[free, no key]', but each sentence otherwise contributes useful information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a tool with four required parameters and no output schema, the description covers the main invocation context, auth requirement, and a distinct failure branch. It does not specify the exact shape of the returned key or error, which is a small gap given there is no output schema to fill it.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description explains the overall cryptographic proof flow using the parameters, but it does not add per-parameter meaning beyond the schema, which already documents agent_id, timestamp, nonce, and signature formats.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific verb-resource pair ('mint API key') and immediately scopes it: self-serve, free-tier, for agents without an email inbox. It also states the authentication mechanism (HMAC-SHA256 with the MACHINE_MINT_SECRET), making it clear what this tool uniquely does relative to the unrelated sibling tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly names the intended user (an autonomous agent with no email inbox) and tells the agent to call once and branch on the not_configured failure before planning. It does not name alternatives or state when not to use it, but no sibling appears to offer key issuance, so this is a minor gap.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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