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PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy

verify_receipt

Read-only

verify the recipient. Call this when you have a receipt and want to know whether it is genuine, without trusting the server that issued it. Returns VALID with the verdict it attests to, INVALID if the payload was altered, or UNVERIFIABLE when the key cannot be fetched — and UNVERIFIABLE is a refusal, not a pass. Needs only the receipt JSON and a network connection; no account, no shared secret. Fetches the signing key from a published URL you can pin with key_url.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "receipt": "<receipt>"
    },
    "name": "verify_receipt"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
key_urlNoOverride the published key location
receiptYesThe receipt object as issued

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Well beyond the annotations, it enumerates the three outcome states (VALID, INVALID, UNVERIFIABLE) and stresses that UNVERIFIABLE is a refusal rather than a pass — a critical semantic the agent would otherwise misread. It also discloses prerequisites (only receipt JSON plus network, no account or shared secret) and the key-fetching behavior that makes the openWorldHint=true annotation concrete.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Dense but front-loaded: trigger, verdicts, requirements, then key pinning. The only waste is the leading 'verify the recipient' fragment, which does not match the receipt-centric rest of the text.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the return-value burden and does so explicitly via the three verdicts, plus it covers prerequisites and the trust model. Nothing further is needed to call a two-parameter read-only tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3; the description earns above that by explaining that key_url pins the published key location, which conveys the security intent behind the override rather than just its syntax.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource ('verify... whether it is genuine') and scopes it to receipts, which distinguishes it from the evaluate_* / validate_policy siblings. The opening fragment 'verify the recipient' is slightly off-key for a receipt tool and briefly muddies what is being verified, though the following sentence corrects it.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives a clear trigger: call this when you hold a receipt and want to know whether it is genuine without trusting the issuing server. No exclusions or named alternatives are provided, but the trust-model framing implicitly separates it from server-side evaluation tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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