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incident_triage

Read-onlyIdempotent

Classify a security incident and produce severity, likely category, containment steps and a response plan. Use when something has already happened. If all you have is a suspicious IP or domain, run threat_intel_lookup first — it is cheaper and may settle the question. Costs $3 per call.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
indicatorsYes
previous_scan_idNoOptional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored otherwise. Does not change this tool's analysis.
environment_contextNo
incident_descriptionYes

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint true and idempotentHint true. The description adds valuable context beyond annotations: cost ($3 per call), the nature of the analysis, and the output content. No contradiction exists; it could go further on limitations, but the added details are meaningful.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences: purpose, usage guidance, and cost. Front-loaded, every sentence earns its place, and there is no redundancy or filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Covers purpose, usage, output types, and cost, but omits details about required parameters and the environment_context object. With no output schema, the description partially describes returns but leaves much to be inferred. It is adequate for a relatively complex tool but has clear gaps.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is only 25%, and the description does not explain key parameters like incident_description, indicators, or environment_context. The phrase 'If all you have is a suspicious IP or domain' indirectly hints at input criteria but does not substitute for param-level guidance. Given low schema coverage, the description must compensate and does not.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific verb ('classify') and resource ('security incident'), and enumerates concrete outputs (severity, likely category, containment steps, response plan). It also distinguishes from sibling threat_intel_lookup by clarifying when this tool applies ('when something has already happened').

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states when to use ('Use when something has already happened') and provides a direct alternative with rationale ('If all you have is a suspicious IP or domain, run threat_intel_lookup first — it is cheaper and may settle the question'). This is strong, actionable guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes with detailed descriptions that disambiguate overlaps (e.g., dns_security_check vs email_security_audit, ssl_tls_audit vs vet_endpoint). A few compliance lifecycle tools (compliance_framework_check, control_gap_analysis, audit_report_generate) could be confused, but descriptions clarify their sequencing.

Naming Consistency4/5

All tool names use lowercase snake_case, but the verb/noun order varies (e.g., access_review vs agent_history vs cve_lookup). The pattern is readable and predictable enough, with minor inconsistency in whether the resource or action comes first.

Tool Count3/5

28 tools is on the heavy side, exceeding the 25-tool threshold for 'too many' in the calibration. However, the broad security/compliance domain justifies the count, and each tool covers a distinct aspect, though some consolidation (e.g., email_security_audit vs dns_security_check) could reduce redundancy.

Completeness5/5

The toolset covers the full security assessment lifecycle: identity/access review, vulnerability discovery and prioritization, compliance frameworks and gap analysis, evidence collection, policy generation, incident triage, and specialized scans (code, secrets, network, web app, MCP/skill supply chain). No obvious critical gaps for the stated purpose.