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AgentAegis

by io.github.astafford8488

credential_check

Read-onlyIdempotent

Check whether an email address or domain appears in known credential-breach corpora (Have I Been Pwned), with the breaches and data classes exposed. Use when assessing account-takeover exposure. Costs $2 per call.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
targetYes
check_typeYes
previous_scan_idNoOptional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored otherwise. Does not change this tool's analysis.

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and idempotentHint, and the description adds a cost disclosure ($2 per call) plus what data is exposed, providing useful behavioral context. No contradiction with annotations; it adds value beyond them.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences with the purpose, use case, and cost — every word earns its place and the key information is front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given no output schema, the description hints at return contents (breaches and data classes), includes cost and use case, and annotations cover safety. Missing only minor details like rate limits or result structure, but sufficient for a simple check tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Only 33% of parameters have schema descriptions, so the description must compensate. It explains check_type via 'email address or domain' and target implicitly, but doesn't detail format constraints or the optional previous_scan_id beyond what the schema already says.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Description uses specific verb 'Check' with resource 'credential-breach corpora' and explicitly names Have I Been Pwned, clearly distinguishing it from sibling tools like cve_lookup or threat_intel_lookup. It states exactly what is checked (email/domain) and what is returned (breaches, data classes).

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides a clear when-to-use scenario ('Use when assessing account-takeover exposure'), but does not mention exclusions or alternatives. This gives context but stops short of full when-not/alternative guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes with detailed descriptions that disambiguate overlaps (e.g., dns_security_check vs email_security_audit, ssl_tls_audit vs vet_endpoint). A few compliance lifecycle tools (compliance_framework_check, control_gap_analysis, audit_report_generate) could be confused, but descriptions clarify their sequencing.

Naming Consistency4/5

All tool names use lowercase snake_case, but the verb/noun order varies (e.g., access_review vs agent_history vs cve_lookup). The pattern is readable and predictable enough, with minor inconsistency in whether the resource or action comes first.

Tool Count3/5

28 tools is on the heavy side, exceeding the 25-tool threshold for 'too many' in the calibration. However, the broad security/compliance domain justifies the count, and each tool covers a distinct aspect, though some consolidation (e.g., email_security_audit vs dns_security_check) could reduce redundancy.

Completeness5/5

The toolset covers the full security assessment lifecycle: identity/access review, vulnerability discovery and prioritization, compliance frameworks and gap analysis, evidence collection, policy generation, incident triage, and specialized scans (code, secrets, network, web app, MCP/skill supply chain). No obvious critical gaps for the stated purpose.

Resources