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get_security_coverage_for_object

Read-onlyIdempotent

WHEN: developer/security architect needs to know WHICH ROLES can access a specific form, table, menu item or service operation. Triggers: 'who can access', 'which roles see', 'security coverage for', 'quels roles ont accès à', 'find roles with access'. Walks the security graph backwards (EntryPoint -> Privilege -> Duty -> Role) and returns all roles that grant any level of access (Read / Update / Create / Delete / Correct) on the given object. Read-only: scans the in-memory KB, never writes.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
maxRolesNoMaximum roles to expand (default 30, max 100).
minGrantNoOptional: minimum grant level to include in results. Values: 'Read', 'Update', 'Create', 'Delete', 'Correct', 'Any'. Default: 'Any'.Any
objectNameYesObject name to audit (form, table, menu item, service operation). Example: 'CustTable', 'SalesTableListPage', 'CustCustomerServiceMenu'.

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and idempotentHint. The description reinforces these by stating 'Read-only: scans the in-memory KB, never writes' and adds useful behavioral detail about traversing the security graph and returning roles at any grant level. This goes beyond the annotations without contradicting them.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured and front-loaded: it opens with WHEN, includes trigger examples, explains the mechanism, and ends with the safety guarantee. Every sentence contributes to intent matching or invocation knowledge, with no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a read-only, in-memory lookup with fully documented parameters, the description provides the essential outcome (returned roles), scope (specific object types), and mechanism. It lacks an explicit return-format note, but since there is no output schema, a brief statement of the result shape would make it fully complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents objectName, maxRoles, and minGrant with descriptions and examples. The description adds contextual value by clarifying that the tool returns roles with 'any level of access (Read / Update / Create / Delete / Correct)', but it does not substantially extend the parameter semantics beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's purpose: given a specific object (form, table, menu item, or service operation), it returns all roles that can access it. The verb 'get' plus the resource 'security coverage for object' is precise, and the backward graph traversal (EntryPoint -> Privilege -> Duty -> Role) concretely distinguishes it from sibling tools like trace_security_chain or generate_security_report.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides WHEN guidance and explicit trigger phrases ('who can access', 'which roles see', 'find roles with access'), making the intended invocation clear. It does not name alternative tools or state when not to use this tool, so it falls just short of full exclusion-based guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have distinct purposes and clear triggers, reducing ambiguity. For example, PR-related tools are separated into analysis, listing, commenting, and dependency mapping. However, some overlap exists between find_references, find_extensions, and find_callers, which could confuse an agent without careful descriptions.

Naming Consistency4/5

Tool names follow a consistent snake_case pattern with verb_noun structure within subgroups (e.g., ado_*, find_*, search_*, generate_*). There is no mixing of camelCase or other styles, though the variety of prefixes slightly reduces predictability.

Tool Count3/5

With 38 tools, the server feels slightly over-scoped for its domain. While each tool has a specific function, the number is high compared to typical well-scoped servers (10-15 tools). Some tools like find_references and find_callers could be consolidated.

Completeness4/5

The tool set covers a broad range of D365 F&O development and DevOps tasks, including code search, analysis, security, performance, upgrades, and work item management. Minor gaps exist, such as the absence of direct object modification or batch job management, but the core workflows are well covered.