Audits target URLs, API endpoints, and Web3 dApp domains for IDN homograph spoofing, Angel/Pink/Inferno drainer scripts, and hidden DOM prompt injections. Price: 0.02 USDC on Base or Solana.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | Yes | URL or domain to inspect |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | Yes | ||
| verdict | No | ||
| is_phishing | Yes | ||
| homograph_spoof | Yes | ||
| drainer_kit_signature | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Output schema / (root)Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+ "properties": {
+ "drainer_kit_signature": {
+ "nullable": true,
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "homograph_spoof": {
+ "type": "boolean"
+ },
+ "is_phishing": {
+ "type": "boolean"
+ },
+ "url": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "verdict": {
+ "type": "string"
+ }
+ },
+ "required": [
+ "url",
+ "is_phishing",
+ "homograph_spoof"
+ ],
+ "type": "object"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already cover read-only/open-world/non-destructive, so the bar is lower, and the description still adds a genuinely new behavioral fact: it costs 0.02 USDC on Base or Solana. What it omits is the mechanics of that payment (wallet/auth requirement, when the charge is triggered), which matters for an agent deciding whether it can call it.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences with no filler: the first defines what is audited and against what, the second front-loads the cost before the agent commits. Nothing is redundant with the schema or annotations.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and the threat coverage is well specified for a single-parameter tool. The remaining gap is how the paid-call flow works (when payment is required, what happens on failure), which an agent needs to invoke reliably.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% with a single documented 'url' parameter, so the baseline is 3. The description adds only a mild hint that domains and API endpoints are acceptable inputs, not just full URLs, but gives no formatting or normalization guidance.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Names a specific verb (audits) and resource (URLs, API endpoints, Web3 dApp domains) and enumerates the exact threat classes it detects (IDN homograph spoofing, Angel/Pink/Inferno drainers, hidden DOM prompt injections). That makes the function unmistakable, though it never names its nearest sibling (auditUrlAgentReadiness) or checkWalletDrainer to draw the boundary.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description never states when to call this versus the adjacent URL/wallet-audit siblings, nor any prerequisite for use. The only usage-adjacent information is a price line, which tells cost but not selection criteria or exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.