Audits EVM wallet and counterparty addresses on Base for Permit2 drainer exposure, approval phishing history, and OFAC sanctions flags. Price: 0.02 USDC on Base or Solana.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain_id | No | ||
| wallet_address | Yes | EVM wallet address to screen (0x...) |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| verdict | No | ||
| permit2_risk | Yes | ||
| wallet_address | Yes | ||
| ofac_sanctioned | No | ||
| drainer_detected | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Output schema / (root)Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+ "properties": {
+ "drainer_detected": {
+ "type": "boolean"
+ },
+ "ofac_sanctioned": {
+ "type": "boolean"
+ },
+ "permit2_risk": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "verdict": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "wallet_address": {
+ "type": "string"
+ }
+ },
+ "required": [
+ "wallet_address",
+ "drainer_detected",
+ "permit2_risk"
+ ],
+ "type": "object"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnly/openWorld/non-destructive, and the description adds genuinely new behavior: an explicit price (0.02 USDC on Base or Solana) and the concrete checks performed. It stops short of saying how payment is settled or whether results are cached/point-in-time, which would matter for a paid call.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, no filler, with the audited dimensions front-loaded and cost appended. Slightly under-specified rather than padded, so length is not the problem.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Output schema exists so return values need no explanation, and annotations cover the safety profile, but the unresolved chain_id semantics and lack of sibling differentiation leave real gaps for a paid, open-world audit tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is only 50% and the undocumented parameter is chain_id, whose existence is actively muddled by the description's claim that the audit is 'on Base' (default 8453). An agent cannot tell from either source whether non-Base chains are supported or what chain_id changes.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Specific verb (audits) plus resource (EVM wallet/counterparty addresses) and three named audit dimensions (Permit2 drainer exposure, approval phishing history, OFAC sanctions). However, it does not distinguish this from close siblings like checkWalletSanctions or analyzeEvmWallet, and 'counterparty addresses' hints at scope the single wallet_address parameter cannot express.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No statement of when to choose this over checkWalletSanctions (sanctions-only) or analyzeEvmWallet (general wallet analysis), which is the primary routing question an agent faces. The only contextual cue is the price line, which is not usage guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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