Audits Base smart contracts for hidden transfer locks, owner blacklist modifiers, unverified proxy upgrades, and malicious fee-on-transfer hooks. Price: 0.02 USDC on Base or Solana.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain_id | No | ||
| contract_address | Yes | Base contract address (0x...) |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| can_buy | Yes | ||
| verdict | No | ||
| can_sell | No | ||
| is_honeypot | Yes | ||
| contract_address | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Output schema / (root)Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+ "properties": {
+ "can_buy": {
+ "type": "boolean"
+ },
+ "can_sell": {
+ "type": "boolean"
+ },
+ "contract_address": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "is_honeypot": {
+ "type": "boolean"
+ },
+ "verdict": {
+ "type": "string"
+ }
+ },
+ "required": [
+ "contract_address",
+ "is_honeypot",
+ "can_buy"
+ ],
+ "type": "object"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint/openWorldHint/destructiveHint, so the safety profile is covered; the description adds the genuinely non-obvious fact that the call is paid (0.02 USDC on Base or Solana), which is exactly the kind of auth/cost context annotations cannot express. It does not state what happens on missing payment or expected latency, keeping it below 5.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, front-loaded with the capability and followed by the cost constraint. Every clause carries signal; nothing is redundant.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema present, return values need no explanation, and readOnly annotations cover safety. The description supplies the one thing structured fields cannot — the paid-call requirement — so an agent has what it needs to decide and invoke.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Only 2 parameters at 50% schema coverage; 'contract_address' is documented in the schema, while 'chain_id' has no description and is never explained in prose. The description's repeated 'Base' scoping partially accounts for the 8453 default, but the mention of Solana payment muddies whether other chains are supported.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
A specific verb ('Audits') plus resource ('Base smart contracts') and an enumerated set of checks (transfer locks, blacklist modifiers, proxy upgrades, fee-on-transfer hooks) make the purpose unambiguous. It stops short of 5 because the sibling 'inspectContractInfo' plausibly overlaps and is never acknowledged or contrasted.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The security-audit framing implies when to reach for it (vetting a token/contract before interaction), but there is no explicit when-not guidance and no routing to alternatives such as inspectContractInfo or runFullEnterpriseRiskAudit. Usage is inferable rather than stated.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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