Skip to main content
Glama

auditMcpToolSchema

Read-only

Inspects Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool definitions, JSON schemas, and server cards for hidden instructions, tool shadowing, and data exfiltration vectors. Price: 0.010 USDC on Base or Solana.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
tool_nameYes
input_schemaNo
tool_descriptionYes

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
verdictYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / input_schema
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / tool_description
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • changedInput schema / required
      Previous value: -[
      -  "tool_name"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "tool_name",
      +  "tool_description"
      +]
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "properties": {
      +    "verdict": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "required": [
      +    "verdict"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  3. Added

TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, destructiveHint=false and openWorldHint=true, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely new context — a per-call price of 0.010 USDC on Base or Solana — which is a meaningful operational constraint. It says nothing about what happens on a positive finding or whether the call is free vs paid for retries.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tight sentences, with the capability stated first and the pricing constraint appended. Nothing is redundant, though the price sentence mixes operational metadata into what is otherwise a pure-purpose statement.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists so return values need no explanation, and annotations cover safety. But with a nested object parameter at 0% schema coverage and a same-domain sibling left unaddressed, the definition leaves real gaps for an agent deciding whether and how to call it.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% and the description never mentions any of the three parameters. In particular it does not clarify the distinction or relationship between tool_name and tool_description, nor what input_schema should contain, so the agent must infer required payload shape entirely from field names.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and resource ('Inspects ... MCP tool definitions, JSON schemas, and server cards') and enumerates the threat classes it checks for (hidden instructions, tool shadowing, exfiltration). It never distinguishes itself from the near-identical sibling auditMcpToolPoisoning, so an agent cannot tell the two apart from this text alone.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied by the 'when you have an MCP tool definition to inspect' framing; there is an explicit alternative (auditMcpToolPoisoning) sharing the same domain and the description gives no criteria for choosing between them. No exclusions or prerequisites are stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.