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auditMcpToolPoisoning

Read-only

Inspects Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool definitions, descriptions, and JSON schemas for hidden prompt overrides, shadowing attacks, and exfiltration sinks. Price: 0.02 USDC on Base or Solana.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
tool_nameYes
input_schemaNo
tool_descriptionYes

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
verdictNo
tool_nameYes
shadowing_riskYes
poisoning_detectedYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / required
      Previous value: -[
      -  "tool_name"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "tool_name",
      +  "tool_description"
      +]
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "properties": {
      +    "poisoning_detected": {
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "shadowing_risk": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "tool_name": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "verdict": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "required": [
      +    "tool_name",
      +    "poisoning_detected",
      +    "shadowing_risk"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  3. Added

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, destructiveHint=false, and openWorldHint=true, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds a genuinely non-derivable behavioral fact: the call costs 0.02 USDC on Base or Solana, which matters for agent planning. It does not say what happens if payment fails or whether the audit blocks on chain confirmation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, front-loaded with the purpose and threat model, with the cost disclosure as a compact trailing sentence. No filler and nothing redundant with the annotations.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, and the safety annotations are rich. But for a paid, open-world auditing tool with nested-object parameters, the description omits payment mechanics and any tie-break against auditMcpToolSchema, leaving real gaps an agent must resolve by guessing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description carries the burden. It partially compensates by naming the three artifacts inspected (name, description, JSON schema), which maps one-to-one onto tool_name, tool_description, and input_schema. It gives no format or size expectations for input_schema, and required-vs-optional intent is left entirely to the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (inspects) and precise resource (MCP tool definitions, descriptions, JSON schemas) plus the exact threat classes it hunts for (prompt overrides, shadowing, exfiltration sinks). However, it never distinguishes itself from the very similar sibling auditMcpToolSchema, so an agent must guess between the two.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: an agent can infer you call it to vet an MCP tool before trusting it. There is no explicit when-to-use, no when-not-to-use, and no routing guidance versus auditMcpToolSchema, guardAgentMemory, or runFullEnterpriseRiskAudit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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