backend

Evaluate Trade

evaluate_trade

Read-onlyIdempotent

Pre-trade risk check for a proposed trade. Call this BEFORE executing any trade and treat a "deny" decision as a hard stop.

Evaluated at a fixed Tier 1 ceiling ($5,000 notional) — MCP callers do not get COLR tier gating. For higher tiers, use the REST API with wallet-signature authentication.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`side`	Yes	"buy" or "sell".
`asset`	Yes	Asset symbol, e.g. NVDA, AAPL, TSLA, USDG.
`amount`	Yes	Quantity in token units — NOT a pre-computed USD value.
`wallet`	Yes	EVM wallet address (0x...) the trade would execute from.
`request_id`	No	Optional idempotency key.
`contract_address`	Yes	Token contract address (0x...). Must match the official registry address for that symbol, or the trade is denied as a suspected fake token.
`max_slippage_bps`	No	Max slippage in basis points (default 100).

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`tier`	Yes	Tier the wallet was evaluated at (1-3).
`error`	No	If present, no verdict was produced. Treat as a hard stop; do not execute the trade.
`reasons`	Yes	Human-readable reasons. Entries prefixed with 'ADVISORY:' are non-blocking context; all other entries drove the decision.
`decision`	Yes	Final verdict. 'deny' is a hard stop.
`audit_seq`	No	Monotonic sequence number of this decision.
`price_usd`	Yes	Asset price used for the valuation.
`audit_hash`	No	SHA-256 hash chaining this decision.
`request_id`	No	Echoed idempotency key, if provided.
`risk_score`	Yes	Composite risk score from 0 (safe) to 100 (blocked).
`price_source`	Yes	Where the price came from.
`max_trade_usd`	Yes	USD ceiling for this tier.
`calculated_notional_usd`	Yes	USD value of the proposed trade.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedSep 16, 2026

TDQS

A4.5/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false, covering the safety profile. The description adds the fixed Tier 1 ceiling and the hard-stop semantics, which are not in annotations. It doesn't contradict annotations and provides extra behavioral context without over-explaining.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is two short paragraphs with no filler. The critical instruction to call before executing and the hard-stop treatment are front-loaded. The tier ceiling and alternative are concisely stated in the second paragraph. Every sentence earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the output schema exists and annotations cover safety, the description is complete. It covers when to call, the decision semantics, the tier limitation, and the alternative for higher tiers. Nothing essential for correct invocation is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all parameters thoroughly. The description adds no additional parameter-level meaning beyond what the schema provides, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Pre-trade risk check for a proposed trade.' It clearly differentiates from siblings like check_token_safety and simulate_balance by focusing on evaluating a trade's risk before execution. The 'deny' decision as a hard stop adds specificity.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly instructs to call this BEFORE executing any trade and to treat a 'deny' decision as a hard stop. It also provides an exclusion: for higher tiers, use the REST API with wallet-signature authentication. This leaves no ambiguity about when and when not to use the tool.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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