Skip to main content
Glama
Sign In

Runcrate

by io.github.aeonmindai
OverviewDiscussionsAdmin

Run a command on an instance

ssh_execute
Destructive

Run a command on a running instance via SSH. Uses keyless SSH certificates. Returns the command output.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>",
      "command": "<command>"
    },
    "name": "ssh_execute"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesInstance ID
commandYesShell command to execute
timeoutNoTimeout in ms (default: 30000, max: 60000)
workspaceNoWorkspace ID (optional: defaults to the authenticated workspace)
environmentNoEnvironment name (optional: defaults to the environment this session acts in)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • removedInput schema / properties / env
      Removed value: -{
-  "description": "Environment name (optional — defaults to main)",
-  "type": "string"
-}
    • addedInput schema / properties / environment
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "Environment name (optional: defaults to the environment this session acts in)",
+  "type": "string"
+}
    • changedInput schema / properties / workspace / description
      Previous value: -"Workspace ID (optional — defaults to authenticated workspace)"New value: +"Workspace ID (optional: defaults to the authenticated workspace)"
  2. First observed

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, readOnlyHint=false, and idempotentHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuine non-annotation context: keyless SSH certificate auth and that the command output is returned. However, it does not warn that arbitrary commands are executed with the instance's privileges or that effects are irreversible, which for a destructive tool would be valuable.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the core action, then auth mechanism, then return behavior. Zero filler and nothing important buried.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description usefully states that the command output is returned, and the schema fully covers all five parameters. What remains thin is failure/error behavior and the irreversible nature of the execution, minor gaps for a tool whose annotations carry the safety profile.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all five parameters including timeout defaults/limits and workspace/environment fallbacks. The description adds no parameter-level meaning beyond that, which is the expected baseline when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Run a command') and resource ('a running instance') with the transport ('via SSH'), so the agent knows exactly what operation this performs. It is distinct from the instance lifecycle tools and job tools, though it stops short of naming the closest sibling (run_job) to disambiguate.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no explicit when-to-use guidance, no when-not-to-use, and no named alternative. The only usage cue is the implicit precondition 'running instance,' which the agent must infer. Nothing tells the agent whether this is preferred over run_job or stuck instances.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All Runcrate toolsInspect
Try in Browser
One endpoint for every MCP toolRayrun runs every MCP server behind one URL and holds the credentials. Each call is decided per client, tool, and argument, then recorded.ray.runAd

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources