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wallet_check

[Wallet Oracle] Pre-transaction counterparty check for an EVM wallet or contract: OFAC SDN screening, GoPlus malicious-address flags (phishing, drainers, laundering, mixers ...), and a live on-chain profile (EOA / contract / EIP-7702, nonce, balance, ENS, first transaction, contract verification) — Pre-transaction counterparty check for an EVM wallet or contract: OFAC SDN screening, GoPlus malicious-address flags (phishing, drainers, laundering, mixers ...), and a live on-chain profile (EOA / contract / EIP-7702, nonce, balance, ENS, first transaction, contract verification). Returns risk_level, a plain recommendation (do_not_transact / review_before_transacting / no_red_flags_found), every reason with its source, and which sources were unavailable.

Example: /v1/wallet-check?address=0xd8dA6BF26964aF9D7eEd9e03E53415D37aA96045&chain=ethereum

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
chainNoOptional. ethereum, base, arbitrum, optimism, polygon (default base).
addressYesRequired. A 0x address.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added
  2. Removed
  3. First observed

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does fairly well: it names the data sources (OFAC SDN, GoPlus, live chain state), states which behaviors are profiled (EOA vs contract vs EIP-7702, verification status, nonce/balance), and discloses that some sources may be unavailable. It stops short of permission requirements, rate limits, or cost, which is the remaining gap.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness2/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The first long sentence is duplicated verbatim in the body of the description, wasting roughly half the text on repetition. The useful return-value and example information is buried after the duplicate instead of being front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, and the description compensates by describing the return contract: `risk_level`, a plain recommendation enum, per-reason source attribution, and unavailable sources. Combined with the parameter schema, an agent has enough to call and interpret this correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% with only two parameters, so the schema already documents `address` and the chain enum with its default. The description adds only an example URL that clarifies usage syntax; baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb+resource (pre-transaction counterparty check on an EVM address) and enumerates the checks performed (OFAC SDN, GoPlus flags, on-chain profile). It is clear about what the tool does, but it never distinguishes itself from the sibling `wallet_sanctions_check`, which by name appears to cover overlapping OFAC screening territory.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

'Pre-transaction counterparty check' implies the moment of use (before sending funds), which is useful context. However, there is no explicit when-not guidance and no reference to the closely related `wallet_sanctions_check` or `reputation_query` siblings, leaving the agent to guess which screening tool to pick.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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