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Delete vault item

well_delete_vault_item
Destructive

Delete one of the user's own vault items, such as a saved login, so Well no longer signs in to that site for them. The secret is erased; the history of its uses stays. Call it when the user asks to delete, remove or forget the login, identifier or password Well keeps for a site ("supprime celui d'Amazon", "delete my saucedemo login", "oublie mon mot de passe Free"), after well_list_vault_items gave the item's vault_item_id.

Pass the vault_item_id of exactly one item from well_list_vault_items. When the user names a login to delete ("supprime celui d'Amazon") and no list was read in this conversation, call well_list_vault_items first, without asking anything: its rows tell which login the user means, even with no earlier context. Ask only after reading the list: when several rows could match, ask which one, naming each by site and user name; when none matches, name the saved sites. Never guess an id.

This tool never changes or reveals a password, and no chat tool does: never ask for a password, never repeat one the user typed, and never name a place in the conversation that takes one.

A login saved on several addresses of one site under one user name is one login: the delete removes it on each of them, even where an address keeps another password.

The result is status "deleted" with the site and user name of the deleted login. A refusal means the login is still saved: say so, and do not retry.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
workspace_idNoTarget workspace. Omit when the token authorizes one workspace. Required when it authorizes several — a write lands in exactly one workspace and this call would not say which.
vault_item_idYesThe vault_item_id of the item to delete, from well_list_vault_items.
conversation_idNoThe conversation id returned by the previous Well result, in its meta under well/conversation_id, in its structuredContent, or in its JSON text block. Pass it back on every call in the same conversation, including a call a card makes, so the chosen workspace and the earlier answers still apply. It decides the conversation on its own: nothing the host states about the session replaces it. Omit it only on the first call of a conversation.
idempotency_keyNoOptional client-supplied key. A retried write with the same key returns the original result instead of re-applying the operation.
workspace_scopeNoRestrict this call to the family: the token's primary workspace plus the company workspaces under it that you are a member of. Unrelated authorized workspaces drop out of the read; row reads merge across the family, while a per-workspace figure still reports exactly one workspace.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
codeNo
siteNoThe site of the deleted login, as its host.
errorNo
statusNo
successYes
usernameNoThe user name of the deleted login.
reply_linesNo
conversation_idNoThe conversation this result belongs to. Pass it back as the conversation_id argument on every later Well call in the same conversation.
near_candidatesNo
newly_connectedNoTools that connected to this workspace since the last result and that no session was told about yet, oldest first. Present only when at least one tool is new. The connected-line rule says when to tell an entry; when it does, one line per entry, in the person's language: "<name> is connected.". Never fold several entries into one sentence. Each entry comes back once, on one result only: never repeat its line later.
conversation_id_noteNoPresent only when the server opened a fresh lane, stating that no choice recorded earlier was read.
conversation_id_sourceNoWhere the conversation id came from: the host's own request meta, the caller's argument, or a fresh lane the server opened.
near_candidates_truncatedNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, but the description adds real substance: the secret is erased while use history is retained, a login spanning several addresses of one site is deleted everywhere, the success result is status 'deleted' with site and user name, and a refusal means the login is still saved and must not be retried. It also states a hard boundary that no chat tool ever reveals or accepts a password.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with purpose and trigger examples before the procedural rules, and nearly every sentence carries operational weight. It runs long and the password-handling prohibition is restated twice ('never ask for a password' / 'never name a place in the conversation that takes one'), which is the only meaningful slack.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Covers trigger, precondition, disambiguation, mutation scope, refund semantics, and the shape of the success and refusal outcomes — and an output schema exists so return structure needn't be spelled out further. Nothing an agent needs to call this destructive tool safely is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description goes beyond it by requiring the id come from well_list_vault_items and by insisting on exactly one item ('never guess an id'), which constrains how the parameter may be sourced. It does not discuss workspace_id, conversation_id, or idempotency_key, but the schema documents those thoroughly.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Delete one of the user's own vault items, such as a saved login') and immediately scopes it against siblings by naming well_list_vault_items and well_get_vault_item as the read path. An agent can distinguish this from dozens of other well_delete_* tools without opening a schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit when-to-use triggers with multilingual example utterances, plus a mandatory pre-step (call well_list_vault_items first, without asking anything), and clear disambiguation rules: ask only after reading the list, name candidate rows by site and user name, name saved sites when nothing matches, never guess an id. This is about as prescriptive as usage guidance gets.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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