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widespread

wide_identity_revoke

Destructive

Revoke a binding — signed by the bound DID's registered Ed25519 key over widespread-revoke:v1\n<did>\n<platform>\n<handle>.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "did": "<did>",
      "platform": "<platform>",
      "handle": "<handle>",
      "sig_hex": "<sig_hex>"
    },
    "name": "wide_identity_revoke"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
didYes
handleYes
sig_hexYes
platformYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

B3.3/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false and openWorldHint=true, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds one genuinely new behavioral fact — that revocation must be authenticated by the bound DID's registered Ed25519 key — but says nothing about what revocation destroys, whether it is permanent, or how failures are reported.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single front-loaded sentence with the action first and the signing requirement second; nothing is padding. Minor ambiguity in whether the `\n` sequences are literal newlines or escapes, which could be stated more cleanly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, non-idempotent mutation with no output schema and no parameter descriptions, the definition covers the authentication path but omits consequences of the operation, preconditions on the binding's existence, and error behavior. It is enough to attempt a correct call, but not enough to predict the outcome.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With 0% schema description coverage across four parameters, the description compensates strongly by spelling out the exact signed payload `widespread-revoke:v1\n<did>\n<platform>\n<handle>`, which implicitly ties sig_hex to the other three fields. It does not document expected formats for did, platform, or handle (no DID method or platform naming convention), leaving a residual gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Revoke a binding') plus the precondition that the request must be signed by the bound DID's registered Ed25519 key, which separates it from wide_identity_bind and wide_identity_resolve. It never names a sibling alternative explicitly, so it falls short of the top mark.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to call this versus wide_identity_bind, whether the binding must first exist, or how to obtain the signature (e.g. via wide_identity_challenge then signing locally). The only implied usage context is the signing requirement embedded in the canonical string.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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