Skip to main content
Glama

widespread

wide_broadcast

Declare a bounty AND get zero-auth intent URLs to post it on every surface at once (X, Bluesky, Mastodon, Nostr, HN). One escrow, N surfaces, duplicate submissions deduped, one payout.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "spec": "<spec>",
      "amount": "<amount>"
    },
    "name": "wide_broadcast"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
specYes
meterNo
amountYes
domainNo
windowNo
currencyNo
thresholdNo
funder_didNo
payer_emailNo
verificationNo
funder_handleNo
target_handleNo
target_platformNo
deliverable_classNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed4 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / deliverable_class / enum
      Previous value: -[
      -  "draft",
      -  "publish"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "draft",
      +  "publish",
      +  "resource"
      +]
    • addedInput schema / properties / meter
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / threshold
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": "number"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / window
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
  2. Added

TDQS

B3.1/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=false, openWorldHint=true, idempotentHint=false and destructiveHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuine behavior beyond that: an escrow is created, submissions across surfaces are deduped, and payout is consolidated. However, it never warns that with idempotentHint=false a repeated call would create a second escrowed bounty, which is a material risk for a money-bearing mutation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single dense sentence, front-loaded with the action and the payoff, with no filler. Some phrasing is jargon-heavy ("zero-auth intent URLs", "One escrow, N surfaces") that a first-time caller may not parse, but nothing is redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

This is a complex, money-moving, 14-parameter mutation with a nested object and no output schema, yet the description explains neither the parameters nor what the returned intent URLs look like or how to post them. Given the complexity and zero schema coverage, the description is far too thin to let an agent call it correctly on its own.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% across 14 parameters including a nested verification object and a deliverable_class enum, so the description carries the full explanatory burden and does not meet it. No parameter is named or explained; only a faint hint exists via "one escrow" (amount/currency) and "every surface" (which has no corresponding parameter at all).

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific verb and resource ("Declare a bounty") and states the distinctive output ("zero-auth intent URLs") plus the target surfaces (X, Bluesky, Mastodon, Nostr, HN). The "Declare a bounty AND get intent URLs" phrasing implicitly separates it from the plain wide_bounty_declare sibling, though it never names that sibling to make the distinction explicit.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: the description suggests this is the multi-surface option, from which an agent can infer it should pick single-surface alternatives otherwise. There is no explicit when-to-use/when-not guidance, no prerequisites, and no named alternative (wide_bounty_declare is an obvious candidate but is not referenced).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.