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ncrypted

Create one-time secret

ncrypted_create

Store a password, API key or sensitive note as a one-time link that self-destructs after a single read. The first 3 per day are free (TTL up to 24h); after that each costs 0.005 USDC, paid via x402 on Base (your MCP client must support x402). Share the link with a person or another agent; never echo the secret in chat. Hosted mode: this server encrypts the secret for you, so it sees the plaintext briefly over TLS (never stored or logged). For end-to-end, zero-knowledge encryption run the local MCP server npx -y @seidl-family/ncrypted-mcp instead.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
secretYesThe sensitive value to share. Max 64 KB.
passphraseNoOptional second factor the recipient also needs. Share it through a different channel.
ttl_secondsNoExpiry if never read. Default 86400 (24h), max 7 days.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly: self-destruct after one read, free tier and paid x402 flow, TTL pricing boundary, and the hosted-mode plaintext exposure over TLS. It also discloses the zero-knowledge local alternative. This is unusually rich disclosure for a mutation/creation tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the core purpose, then adds only decision-relevant details: pricing, payment requirement, sharing guidance, privacy model, and local alternative. There is no filler, and every sentence affects correct use of the tool.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description covers purpose, cost, payment support requirement, privacy model, and an alternative deployment, which is substantial for a tool with no annotations and no output schema. It does not explicitly describe the return value or link format, which is a minor gap given the absence of an output schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all three parameters are already documented in the schema. The description reinforces the sensitivity of the secret and the sharing context but adds no new parameter-level syntax, format, or interaction details beyond the schema. Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb and resource: store a password/API key/note as a one-time link that self-destructs after a single read. That is clear and distinct from what a read, burn, or status tool would do. It does not explicitly differentiate itself from the named sibling tools, so it falls short of the highest bar.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives clear usage context: share the link with a person or agent and never echo the secret in chat. It also names an alternative mode (local zero-knowledge server) for privacy-sensitive cases. It does not state when to use this tool versus the read/burn/status siblings, so it lacks explicit exclusions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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