Sautikit

rotate_sip_credential

Destructive

Replace a SIP credential's password. The username is unchanged. Any device currently registered on the old password is disconnected and must be reconfigured, so prefer reveal_sip_credential when the user only wants to see an existing password. Confirm with the user before rotating a credential in use.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "number_id": "<number_id>",
      "credential_id": "<credential_id>"
    },
    "name": "rotate_sip_credential"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`purpose`	No	Required on tools that read data or reports; recommended on every tool. One sentence: what you are doing and why (for example "finding this caller's open ticket to answer them"). Building a report, dashboard, analytics or an export is a SautiDesk Pro feature done by the report tools, not by pulling records.
`number_id`	Yes	tenant number UUID
`credential_id`	Yes	SIP credential UUID (from list_sip_credentials)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedNov 5, 2026

TDQS

A4.8/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only flag destructiveHint=true; the description goes further by disclosing the concrete blast radius (registered devices are disconnected and must be reconfigured) and the operational duty to confirm first. That is exactly the added context the annotation cannot carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four short sentences, purpose front-loaded, then invariant, then consequence, then the caution. No filler and nothing restated from the annotations or schema.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive 3-parameter tool with no output schema it covers side effects, prerequisites and the safer alternative well. The one real gap is the return behavior: it never says whether the new password is generated server-side and returned, which an agent must know before telling the user the rotation succeeded.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3, but the description adds real meaning beyond the schema by declaring what is NOT changed (the username) — a distinction that matters against update_sip_credential. It does not discuss number_id vs credential_id pairing, hence not a 5.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opens with a specific verb+resource ('Replace a SIP credential's password') and immediately fixes the scope invariant ('The username is unchanged'), which separates it from update_sip_credential. It also names reveal_sip_credential as the read-only sibling, so an agent can route without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit when-not ('prefer reveal_sip_credential when the user only wants to see an existing password') and an explicit procedural gate ('Confirm with the user before rotating a credential in use'). Both the alternative tool and the pre-condition are stated, not inferred.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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