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Create Trust Attestation

connect_trust_create
DestructiveIdempotent

Create unidirectional trust attestations on Base (EAS) from the API key owner embedded wallet to one or more wallets or social identities, in a single transaction. Identical active attestations are returned without a new transaction. Recipients still provisioning are reported as processing while the others are attested. Requires CONNECT_API_KEY, Smart Send attestation signer enrolled, and ETH on Base for gas when a new attestation is submitted.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
toYesIdentities to trust (wallet, social, or Connect username). Level, context, and expiresIn apply to every entry. Maximum 50.
levelYesTrust level 1–100
contextNoOptional context such as team:quidli
expiresInNoOptional lifetime in seconds

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / to / description
      Previous value: -"Identities to trust (wallet, social, or Connect username). Level, context, and expiresIn apply to every entry. Maximum 250."New value: +"Identities to trust (wallet, social, or Connect username). Level, context, and expiresIn apply to every entry. Maximum 50."
    • changedInput schema / properties / to / maxItems
      Previous value: -250New value: +50
  2. Changed8 schema fields changed
    • removedInput schema / properties / to / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -true
    • changedInput schema / properties / to / description
      Previous value: -"Identity to trust (wallet, social, or Connect username)"New value: +"Identities to trust (wallet, social, or Connect username). Level, context, and expiresIn apply to every entry. Maximum 250."
    • addedInput schema / properties / to / items
      Added value: +{
      +  "additionalProperties": true,
      +  "properties": {
      +    "id": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "type": {
      +      "enum": [
      +        "email",
      +        "phone",
      +        "telegram",
      +        "discord",
      +        "farcaster",
      +        "twitter",
      +        "github",
      +        "linkedin",
      +        "slack",
      +        "wallet",
      +        "username"
      +      ],
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "username": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "required": [
      +    "type"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / to / maxItems
      Added value: +250
    • addedInput schema / properties / to / minItems
      Added value: +1
    • removedInput schema / properties / to / properties
      Removed value: -{
      -  "id": {
      -    "type": "string"
      -  },
      -  "type": {
      -    "enum": [
      -      "email",
      -      "phone",
      -      "telegram",
      -      "discord",
      -      "farcaster",
      -      "twitter",
      -      "github",
      -      "linkedin",
      -      "slack",
      -      "wallet",
      -      "username"
      -    ],
      -    "type": "string"
      -  },
      -  "username": {
      -    "type": "string"
      -  }
      -}
    • removedInput schema / properties / to / required
      Removed value: -[
      -  "type"
      -]
    • changedInput schema / properties / to / type
      Previous value: -"object"New value: +"array"
  3. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the annotations by disclosing idempotent short-circuiting ('identical active attestations are returned without a new transaction'), partial-success semantics ('recipients still provisioning are reported as processing while the others are attested'), and the full auth/gas requirements. These are exactly the edge-case behaviors an agent needs before calling a write tool with destructiveHint=true.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four sentences, front-loaded with the action and target, then behavior, then prerequisites. Dense but every sentence carries information; the only slight cost is the run-on feel of the prerequisite sentence.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 4-parameter mutation with no output schema, the description covers what it does, what it needs, what it costs (gas), and how it reports the three possible outcomes (created, reused, processing). Nothing essential to a correct invocation is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds non-obvious semantics: level, context, and expiresIn apply uniformly to every entry in the `to` array, which is a cross-parameter rule the schema does not express. It also frames `to` as accepting wallets, socials, or Connect usernames, reinforcing the enum intent.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource — 'Create unidirectional trust attestations on Base (EAS)' — plus the origin (API key owner embedded wallet) and target (wallets or social identities) and the single-transaction batching. This is immediately distinguishable from siblings like connect_trust_revoke and connect_trust_check.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives concrete preconditions (CONNECT_API_KEY, enrolled Smart Send attestation signer, ETH on Base for gas) and clarifies what happens in the reuse and partial-provisioning cases. It stops short of explicitly naming alternatives such as connect_trust_revoke for removal or connect_trust_check for verification, so routing is implied rather than stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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