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pusaka

pusaka_audit

Read-only

Independent proof-of-reserves audit of one Pusaka, without trusting the contract's own numbers: asks NEAR's MPC signer which Bitcoin key it derives for this contract and token (must equal the token's key), recomputes verified_sats from the proven deposits minus everything ever signed away, and looks every proven deposit up on Bitcoin itself (confirmed, paying this address, the right amount, and whether it is still unspent). Returns a verdict and each check.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "token_id": "<token_id>"
    },
    "name": "pusaka_audit"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
token_idYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly=true, destructive=false, openWorld=true, so the safety profile is known. The description adds real value beyond that: it discloses the three external dependencies (NEAR MPC signer key derivation, deposit/withdrawal recomputation, per-deposit Bitcoin lookups including unspent status) and that the tool returns a verdict plus each check. It does not mention latency, rate limits, or what happens if an external lookup fails, keeping it below a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

One dense sentence, front-loaded with the purpose and then the verification steps in a natural order. It is information-rich with little waste, though the parenthetical check list and nested clauses make it a heavier read than necessary.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description usefully sketches the return shape ("a verdict and each check") and enumerates what is verified, which is enough for an agent to call it and interpret the result. The only gap is the unexplained token_id format and no note on failure or partial-verification behavior.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The single parameter token_id has 0% schema description coverage, so the description must carry meaning. It does so only loosely, saying the audit is of "one Pusaka" and referencing "this contract and token", which implies the parameter selects which token to audit but gives no format, naming convention, or contract-vs-token distinction.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("Independent proof-of-reserves audit of one Pusaka") and immediately scopes it against the alternative ("without trusting the contract's own numbers"), which cleanly separates it from a sibling like pusaka_contract_trust. An agent can tell exactly what this tool does before opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The phrase "without trusting the contract's own numbers" tells the agent to reach for this tool when trustless verification is needed, and implicitly positions it against a trust-the-contract sibling. It stops short of naming an alternative or stating when not to use it (e.g. cost/latency trade-offs of hitting Bitcoin and the MPC signer), so it is clear context without explicit exclusions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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