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Smart contract risk check: proxy, bytecode and supply red flags for a Base contract before approving it

contract_risk
Read-only

Check a Base contract before you approve or call it: a low to critical risk tier with named flags (proxy, proxy with no implementation, tiny bytecode, zero token supply), plus bytecode size, the EIP-1967 implementation slot and ERC-20 owner, renounced and paused reads. Unreadable reads are null; EOAs return not-applicable. Limited heuristics, not a full security audit. Use before approving a spender or calling an unfamiliar Base contract. Example: address=0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913. Price $0.01/call via x402 USDC or a card key (/credits), first 25 free; failed calls free. Reads or computes only and changes nothing; each call is charged, so repeats are not free.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
addressYesBase chain contract address, 0x-prefixed 20-byte hex

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond annotations: unreadable reads return null, EOAs return not-applicable, pricing model ($0.01/call, 25 free, failed calls free), and the warning that repeat calls are charged (consistent with idempotentHint=false). This tells the agent the cost and failure semantics, which annotations alone cannot.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads what the tool returns and what it is for, then adds usage, example, pricing, and safety notes. Dense but nearly every clause carries information; the pricing sentence is the longest but is genuinely relevant to repeat calls.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description does the work of naming the returned fields and their edge-case values. It is nearly complete for a single-param read tool, though the exact shape/ordering of the response payload is left implicit.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the single `address` param is already documented, so the schema does the heavy lifting. The description still adds value by pinning the chain to Base and giving a real example address, which prevents cross-chain misuse among the many arb/eth/op/polygon siblings.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource — risk check of a Base contract — plus the exact outputs (risk tier, named flags, bytecode size, EIP-1967 slot, ERC-20 reads). Clearly distinguishes itself from siblings like base_proxy, base_is_contract, and base_token_info, which each cover only one piece of this check.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly says when to use it ('before approving a spender or calling an unfamiliar Base contract') and states a boundary ('Limited heuristics, not a full security audit'), with a concrete example invocation. It does not name sibling alternatives for deeper analysis, which keeps it short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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