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OT Intel API

STIX Representability + Actionability Lookup

getStixCoverage
Read-only

Deterministic lookup grounded in Hahn, Krief et al., 'An Evidence-Driven Analysis of Threat Information Sharing Challenges for Industrial Control Systems' (arXiv:2512.18714v3, Jan 2026). Returns whether STIX 2.1 can represent a given technique/protocol/CVE's artifacts (full/partial/none) and whether public reporting gave enough technical detail to be actionable for detection engineering. No LLM in the lookup path. Price: $0.20 USDC per call via x402 on Base mainnet. An unpaid call returns an x402 PaymentRequired challenge; retry the identical call with the signed payload in _meta["x402/payment"].

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cve_idNoCVE ID from the paper's CISA KEV table, e.g. CVE-2023-3595. At least one of technique_id, protocol, or cve_id is required.
campaignNoOptional filter: Triton, Stuxnet, or Industroyer.
protocolNoICS protocol name, e.g. TriStation, S7Comm, CIP. At least one of technique_id, protocol, or cve_id is required.
technique_idNoMITRE ATT&CK ICS technique ID, e.g. T0836. At least one of technique_id, protocol, or cve_id is required.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With readOnlyHint/openWorldHint already declared, the description adds meaningful context: deterministic lookup with no LLM in the path, $0.20 x402 pricing, and the exact unpaid-call retry behavior. These are non-obvious operational traits not captured by annotations, though return shape detail is thin.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose is front-loaded after a dense paper citation and version/date boilerplate that is mostly extraneous. The payment and lookup-path sentences earn their place, but the bibliographic detail bloat offsets the otherwise tight structure.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, so the description must characterize returns; it does at a high level (full/partial/none plus actionability) and explains the payment/retry flow. A short note on response fields or how partial vs none is signaled would push it higher, but it is adequate for a simple lookup.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so all four parameters (cve_id, campaign, protocol, technique_id) are already documented in the schema, including the at-least-one requirement and examples. The description adds no parameter-level meaning beyond that, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb+resource: it returns STIX 2.1 representability (full/partial/none) and detection-actionability for a technique/protocol/CVE. Purpose is concrete and distinct from siblings like getDetectionArtifacts. It stops short of naming an alternative sibling, so a 4 rather than 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It implies the use case (checking whether artifacts are representable and reportable) but never states when to prefer this over siblings such as getDetectionArtifacts or getCveTriage. Usage must be inferred from the purpose statement rather than read off explicitly.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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