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OT Intel API

Board/GRC-Level Portfolio Risk Aggregator

getRiskExposure
Read-only

Aggregates the same deterministic capability x opportunity x intent scoring used by /ot/threat-score across the actors relevant to a sector+region, ranks them, and returns a DeepSeek-written executive summary (BLUF, ICD-203 language). Portfolio-level companion to /ot/threat-score — for vCISO agents and GRC/board-reporting automation. Price: $0.40 USDC per call via x402 on Base mainnet. An unpaid call returns an x402 PaymentRequired challenge; retry the identical call with the signed payload in _meta["x402/payment"].

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
regionYesTarget region e.g. GCC, KSA, UAE, Qatar, Europe
sectorYesTarget sector e.g. energy, water, manufacturing
timeframeNoOptional lookback window, default 90d90d
vendor_stackNoOptional comma-separated vendor list e.g. 'Schneider Modicon,Siemens SIMATIC' — feeds each actor's capability score, same as /ot/threat-score
compliance_frameworkNoOptional — framework to note qualitatively in the narrative e.g. NIST_CSF_2_0, IEC_62443_3_2

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations cover only readOnly/openWorld, so the description carries the important behavioral burden and does so richly: paid call ($0.40 USDC via x402 on Base), an unpaid call returns a PaymentRequired challenge, and the retry must carry the signed payload in _meta["x402/payment"]. This is exactly the operational context an agent needs to invoke it successfully.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the core purpose, then the sibling relationship, then payment mechanics. Slightly repetitive with '/ot/threat-score' referenced twice, but every clause is informative and there is no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description usefully states what is returned (a DeepSeek-written executive summary in BLUF/ICD-203 style) and fully explains the paid-call flow. Completeness is good; only a brief note on ranking output shape or failure modes beyond payment is absent.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all five parameters, giving a baseline of 3. The description only restates the sector+region scoping and the vendor_stack->capability-score link, which the schema already provides, so it adds no meaning beyond structured data.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: aggregates the capability x opportunity x intent scoring across actors for a sector+region, ranks them, and returns an executive summary. It explicitly positions itself as the portfolio-level companion to /ot/threat-score (getThreatScore), letting an agent distinguish it from the single-target sibling.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear context for use (vCISO agents, GRC/board-reporting automation) and names the relationship to /ot/threat-score as the single-target alternative. It stops short of an explicit when-not-to-use rule (e.g., 'do not use for a single actor'), but the routing intent is inferable.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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