Skip to main content
Glama

OT Intel API

Precursor / Dwell-Time TTP Breakdown

getPrecursorTtp
Read-only

Buckets an actor's known ATT&CK-for-ICS TTPs into pre-impact (reconnaissance through command-and-control — the early-warning window before physical/process disruption) vs impact-stage (inhibit-response-function, impair-process-control, impact). Deterministic tactic-taxonomy lookup against intel.db — no LLM in the classification path. Price: $0.04 USDC per call via x402 on Base mainnet. An unpaid call returns an x402 PaymentRequired challenge; retry the identical call with the signed payload in _meta["x402/payment"].

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
actorYesICS threat actor name e.g. SANDWORM, VOLTZITE, XENOTIME

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the readOnlyHint/openWorldHint annotations: it discloses that classification is a deterministic tactic-taxonomy lookup (no LLM), states a concrete price ($0.04 USDC via x402 on Base mainnet), and describes the exact payment failure path (PaymentRequired challenge, retry with signed payload in _meta['x402/payment']). This is exactly the behavioral context an agent needs to invoke it successfully.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core bucketing behavior, followed by the determinism note and then the payment mechanics — a sensible priority order. The parenthetical bucket enumerations are dense but each clause carries required information; only the phrasing could be tightened.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the return-value burden and does so adequately by naming the two buckets an agent will receive. Combined with the payment and determinism disclosure, a single-parameter read tool is covered well, though exact response field structure remains unspecified.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the single 'actor' parameter is fully documented in the schema, so the baseline is 3. The description references 'an actor's known TTPs' but adds no syntax or format guidance beyond what the schema already provides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (buckets) and resource (an actor's ATT&CK-for-ICS TTPs), then defines the two output buckets precisely — pre-impact (recon through C2) vs impact-stage (inhibit-response-function, impair-process-control, impact). This function is distinctive enough that an agent can separate it from siblings like getThreatActor or getActorDossier without opening a schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description frames the pre-impact bucket as 'the early-warning window before physical/process disruption,' which implies when the tool is valuable, but it never explicitly states when to use this versus alternatives (e.g., getThreatActor for full TTPs) or any exclusions. Usage is inferable rather than directed.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources