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OT Intel API

Asset Risk Score and Escalation Verdict

getAssetExposure
Read-only

Synthesises vendor, model, firmware, sector, and network context into a branchable risk verdict. Returns risk_score (0-100), escalate (boolean), recommended_action, and contributing threat actors. Price: $0.05 USDC per call via x402 on Base mainnet. An unpaid call returns an x402 PaymentRequired challenge; retry the identical call with the signed payload in _meta["x402/payment"].

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
modelYese.g. s7-1500, modicon-m340, controllogix
sectorYesenergy | water | manufacturing | oil-and-gas | chemical | nuclear
vendorYese.g. siemens, schneider, rockwell, ge, honeywell
networkYesinternet-facing | dmz | lan-only | air-gapped
firmwareNoFirmware version e.g. 2.9.2 — enables firmware-specific CVE matching

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, so the safety profile is already covered; the description goes well beyond that by disclosing the paid model ($0.05 USDC via x402 on Base mainnet) and the exact failure/retry contract — an unpaid call returns a PaymentRequired challenge and must be retried with the signed payload in _meta["x402/payment"]. That is non-obvious operational behavior an agent could not derive from structured fields.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, each doing distinct work: purpose first, then the return contract (valuable since there is no output schema), then the payment mechanics. No filler, and the most decision-relevant content is front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description correctly compensates by naming the returned fields (risk_score, escalate, recommended_action, contributing threat actors) and fully covers the payment path. What it omits is sibling disambiguation and any note on whether the optional firmware parameter materially changes the verdict.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all five parameters are already documented with examples and enums-in-text, establishing a baseline of 3. The description restates which inputs feed the synthesis (notably flagging firmware as a contributor) but adds no format, syntax, or defaulting detail beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb and resource ('Synthesises vendor, model, firmware, sector, and network context into a branchable risk verdict') and enumerates the return fields, so the agent knows exactly what it gets. It stops short of distinguishing itself from close siblings like getRiskExposure, getDeviceExposure, or getVendorRisk, which is the only thing keeping it from a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no statement of when to pick this tool over the many overlapping exposure/risk siblings (getRiskExposure, getDeviceExposure, getVendorRisk, getThreatScore). The only procedural guidance concerns payment retry, not tool selection. An agent must infer usage purely from the name and required-parameter shape.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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