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OT Intel API

Attacker AI-Uplift Exposure

getAiUplift
Read-only

Assesses how much a general-purpose AI agent lowers the skill/time barrier for an attacker to reach a vendor's OT-adjacent footprint. Grounded in a real-world precedent (Dragos, May 2026), not frontier-model governance thresholds. Distinct from /ot/ai-exposure, which covers a vendor's OWN embedded AI copilot. DeepSeek-synthesised, ICD-203 estimative language. Price: $0.20 USDC per call via x402 on Base mainnet. An unpaid call returns an x402 PaymentRequired challenge; retry the identical call with the signed payload in _meta["x402/payment"].

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
vendorYesOT/ICS vendor name e.g. Schneider Electric, Siemens, Rockwell Automation
productNoOptional product line filter e.g. Modicon, SIMATIC
auth_typeNosingle-factor, mfa, or unknown (default)
segmentedNotrue, false, or unknown (default). If all three deployment-context params are unknown, the tier is capped at informational.
internet_facingNotrue, false, or unknown (default)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, but the description adds critical operational behavior: the $0.20 USDC x402 price on Base mainnet, and the exact failure/retry contract (an unpaid call returns a PaymentRequired challenge; retry the identical call with the signed payload in _meta["x402/payment"]). It also discloses methodology (DeepSeek-synthesised, ICD-203 estimative language) and the grounding precedent, none of which is derivable from structured fields.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose is front-loaded, followed by differentiation, methodology, and pricing/payment mechanics in a logical order; every sentence carries distinct information. It is slightly long, with some framing ('Grounded in a real-world precedent (Dragos, May 2026), not frontier-model governance thresholds') that leans editorial, but it still serves differentiation.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema and only two light annotations, the description covers the dimensions an agent needs: what is assessed, how it differs from the closest sibling, what it costs, and exactly how to handle the payment challenge. The reference to a capped 'informational' tier also signals that graded output exists, filling the gap left by the missing output schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, with every parameter self-documented in the schema, including the 'unknown' defaults and the tier-capping rule. The description adds no syntax or format detail beyond the schema, so the baseline 3 for schema-carried semantics is correct.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: it 'assesses how much a general-purpose AI agent lowers the skill/time barrier for an attacker to reach a vendor's OT-adjacent footprint.' It also explicitly differentiates itself from the sibling getAiExposure by scope (attacker uplift vs. the vendor's own embedded copilot), so an agent can route between them without opening schemas.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives a clear contrast with the nearest alternative ('Distinct from /ot/ai-exposure, which covers a vendor's OWN embedded AI copilot'), which is genuine when-not-to-use guidance. It stops short of stating a positive triggering condition (e.g., when doing attacker-capability modelling vs. product risk), so it is not fully explicit about when to reach for this tool over getAiAttackFeasibility.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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