LLM-Generated ICS Attack Feasibility
getAiAttackFeasibilityDeterministic lookup against one specific empirical study (Cook, Stoica, Shah & Pezaros, ACM Trans. Priv. Sec. 29, 3, Article 31, June 2026) testing whether off-the-shelf general-purpose LLMs can generate working attack code against real PLCs. Only 3 vendors tested (Siemens, Schneider Electric, Rockwell Automation); only Network/Register-Tags techniques ever succeeded (zero for Application Code/Firmware); 1.08% overall end-to-end success rate. Claude models were excluded by the paper's own authors due to stronger safety guardrails. Distinct from /ot/ai-exposure (vendor's own AI copilot) and /ot/ai-uplift (open-ended reconnaissance-uplift synthesis). Deterministic, no LLM in the lookup path. Price: $0.20 USDC per call via x402 on Base mainnet. An unpaid call returns an x402 PaymentRequired challenge; retry the identical call with the signed payload in _meta["x402/payment"].
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| vendor | No | Siemens, Schneider Electric, or Rockwell Automation — only these three were tested in the study. | |
| campaign | No | Industroyer2, Fuxnet, FrostyGoop, INCONTROLLER, Stuxnet, or Triton. | |
| technique | No | MITRE ICS technique name or ID, e.g. 'Brute Force I/O' or T0806. At least one of technique, vendor, or campaign required. |