Skip to main content
Glama

OT Intel API

Full Threat Actor Report (Markdown)

getActorReport
Read-only

Synthesised Markdown threat report for an ICS/APT actor. Fans out to /ot/actor, /ot/campaign, /ot/malware, /ot/advisory, /ot/detection internally (no extra charge) and synthesises via DeepSeek. Returns executive summary, actor profile, active campaigns, malware families, sector targeting, ATT&CK mappings, recommended actions. TLP: WHITE. Price: $0.25 USDC per call via x402 on Base mainnet. An unpaid call returns an x402 PaymentRequired challenge; retry the identical call with the signed payload in _meta["x402/payment"].

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
actorYesActor name e.g. CHERNOVITE, SANDWORM, VOLTZITE, XENOTIME
sectorNoOptional sector focus e.g. energy, water, manufacturing

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only cover readOnlyHint/openWorldHint, but the description goes well beyond: it discloses the price ($0.25 USDC via x402 on Base mainnet), what an unpaid call returns (PaymentRequired challenge), the exact retry mechanism (_meta["x402/payment"]), the TLP handling, and the internal fan-out/synthesis path. These are operationally critical behaviors an agent must know to invoke it successfully, none of which appear in structured fields.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the purpose, then the fan-out, output contents, TLP, and payment flow in a logical order. Every sentence carries real information, though the endpoint enumeration and the full output-section list make it denser than strictly necessary.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the return-value burden and does so by listing the report sections it produces. It also covers the payment/auth lifecycle and data classification, so an agent has everything needed to call and interpret it.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so both parameters (actor, sector) are already documented with examples and the sector field's optionality. The description adds only the implicit notion of an ICS/APT actor, not new syntax or format detail, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource: a synthesised Markdown threat report for an ICS/APT actor, and enumerates what it returns (executive summary, campaigns, malware families, ATT&CK mappings). It implies a composite/superset capability that separates it from leaf tools like getThreatActor, but it never names or contrasts those siblings explicitly (e.g. getActorDossier, getThreatActor), leaving the agent to infer the distinction.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The 'fans out to ... internally (no extra charge) and synthesises' phrasing implies this is the one-shot comprehensive option versus calling the individual endpoints, which is useful implied guidance. However, there is no explicit when-to-use/when-not statement and no named alternative for narrower lookups, even though many overlapping siblings exist (getActorDossier, getThreatActor, getSectorBrief).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources