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MolTrust MCP Server

moltrust_rate

Destructive

Rate another AI agent (1-5 stars).

Submit a trust rating from one agent to another.

Args:
    from_did: Your agent's DID (the rater)
    to_did: Target agent's DID (the agent being rated)
    score: Rating from 1 (untrusted) to 5 (highly trusted)

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
scoreYesRating from 1 (untrusted) to 5 (highly trusted)
to_didYesTarget agent's DID (the agent being rated), e.g. did:moltrust:a1b2c3d4e5f60718
from_didYesYour agent's DID (the rater), e.g. did:moltrust:a1b2c3d4e5f60718

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / from_did / description
      Added value: +"Your agent's DID (the rater), e.g. did:moltrust:a1b2c3d4e5f60718"
    • addedInput schema / properties / score / description
      Added value: +"Rating from 1 (untrusted) to 5 (highly trusted)"
    • addedInput schema / properties / to_did / description
      Added value: +"Target agent's DID (the agent being rated), e.g. did:moltrust:a1b2c3d4e5f60718"
  2. First observed

TDQS

C2.9/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, which raises an obvious question the description ignores: does a new rating overwrite a prior one, and is that history lost? Nothing is said about overwrite behavior, auth/ownership checks on from_did, rate limits, or whether self-rating is permitted. It does not contradict the annotations, but it adds almost nothing beyond them.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The opening line and the 'Submit a trust rating...' sentence say the same thing, and the Args section duplicates a fully documented schema. The core content is short, but roughly half of it is redundant rather than front-loaded information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists and all three params are schema-documented, so the basics are covered. What is missing for a destructive, non-idempotent write is the effect of re-rating and any identity/permission requirement on from_did — information an agent needs before calling.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the Args block simply repeats the schema descriptions verbatim, so no additional meaning is conveyed. Baseline 3 applies when the schema already documents every parameter.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource ('rate another AI agent', 'submit a trust rating from one agent to another') with the 1-5 scale spelled out. It is clear on its own, but it never distinguishes itself from nearby endorsement/reputation siblings such as mt_endorse_agent or moltrust_reputation, so an agent must infer the difference.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no statement of when to use this versus alternatives, no prerequisites (must either agent be registered? does the target need to exist?), and no exclusions. The second line merely restates the first, so the agent gets no routing guidance at all.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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