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MolTrust MCP Server

by io.github.MoltyCel
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moltrust_credential

Destructive

Issue or verify a W3C Verifiable Credential.

Args:
    action: Either "issue" or "verify"
    subject_did: DID of the credential subject (required for "issue")
    credential_type: Type of credential (default: "AgentTrustCredential", only for "issue")
    credential: JSON string of the credential to verify (required for "verify")

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
actionYesEither "issue" or "verify"
credentialNoJSON string of the credential to verify (required for "verify")
subject_didNoDID of the credential subject (required for "issue"), e.g. did:moltrust:a1b2c3d4e5f60718
credential_typeNoType of credential (default: "AgentTrustCredential", only for "issue")AgentTrustCredential

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed4 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / action / description
      Added value: +"Either \"issue\" or \"verify\""
    • addedInput schema / properties / credential / description
      Added value: +"JSON string of the credential to verify (required for \"verify\")"
    • addedInput schema / properties / credential_type / description
      Added value: +"Type of credential (default: \"AgentTrustCredential\", only for \"issue\")"
    • addedInput schema / properties / subject_did / description
      Added value: +"DID of the credential subject (required for \"issue\"), e.g. did:moltrust:a1b2c3d4e5f60718"
  2. First observed

TDQS

C2.8/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, but the description never explains the destructive aspect: what issuing persists, whether a credential can be revoked or overwritten, or whether verification has side effects. With a destructive mutation in the mix, the silence is a real gap; the description neither contradicts nor supplements the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The opening sentence is well-formed and front-loaded, but the Args block duplicates parameter descriptions already present in the schema, adding length without value. A tighter description would spend those tokens on sibling routing and destructive-behavior disclosure instead.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, but the description omits the behavioral facts an agent needs for a tool flagged destructive and non-idempotent: auth requirements, side effects of 'issue', and how it relates to the dedicated issue/verify siblings. The conditional parameter notes are the only substantive content.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the description's Args block essentially restates the schema descriptions verbatim (and drops the DID example the schema provides), adding no new meaning. Baseline 3 is appropriate since the schema already carries the parameter semantics.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first sentence states a specific verb pair and resource: issuing or verifying a W3C Verifiable Credential. It is clear what the tool does, but it does not distinguish itself from the many credential siblings (moltguard_credential_issue, moltguard_credential_verify, moltrust_verify), so an agent cannot tell from the description alone why this combined tool exists alongside them.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to use this tool versus moltguard_credential_issue or moltguard_credential_verify. The 'required for issue/verify' notes are conditional-parameter facts rather than usage routing, and nothing says when the combined action interface is preferable to the dedicated siblings.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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