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MolTrust MCP Server

moltguard_credential_issue

Destructive

Issue a W3C Verifiable Credential (AgentTrustCredential) for a wallet.

The credential contains the agent's trust score, Sybil score,
ERC-8004 registration status, and MolTrust verification status.
It is cryptographically signed with Ed25519 (JWS).

Args:
    address: Base (EVM) wallet address (0x...)

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
addressYesBase (EVM) wallet address (0x...)

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / address / description
      Added value: +"Base (EVM) wallet address (0x...)"
  2. First observed

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly=false, idempotent=false, destructive=true, and the description usefully adds what the credential contains and that it is JWS-signed. However, for a non-idempotent, destructive-flagged mutation it says nothing about what a repeat call does (new credential each time? overwrites/revokes the prior one?), whether it consumes credits, or whether signing keys are managed server-side.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The opening sentence front-loads purpose, followed by one dense sentence on payload and signature. The trailing 'Args:' block is fully redundant with the schema and is the one segment that does not earn its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return-shape explanation is correctly omitted, but the description stops short on the operational facts an agent needs before firing a destructive, non-idempotent write: re-issuance semantics, cost, and any prerequisite state on the wallet address.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and there is a single required parameter, so the schema alone fully documents it; the description's Args block merely restates 'Base (EVM) wallet address (0x...)' verbatim. Baseline for a single fully-documented param is a 4, with no added semantics beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (issue) and resource (W3C Verifiable Credential / AgentTrustCredential) and enumerates the credential's payload (trust score, Sybil score, ERC-8004 status, MolTrust status) plus the signing scheme (Ed25519 JWS). It never names its natural counterpart moltguard_credential_verify or the other *_issue_vc siblings, so the boundary between issuance tools is left to the agent.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied by the verb: you issue a credential when you want one for a wallet. There is no explicit statement of when to prefer this over moltguard_credential_verify or the mt_*_issue_vc tools, and no preconditions (e.g., must the address be registered or scored first).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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