MolTrust MCP Server

canary_issue

Issue a leak canary for one counterparty: a credential to hand to that counterparty. If anyone else presents it at the MolTrust verifier, you get a signed leak event that names the counterparty. Costs what a credential costs. Needs your MolTrust API key as the X-API-Key header of the MCP connection.

    Args:
        counterparty_did: DID of the agent you hand the credential to; it must be a
              registered, unrevoked MolTrust agent
        mode: "bound" (the counterparty may present it) or "decoy" (any presentation
              but yours is a leak, the counterparty's included); both are issued to
              the counterparty's DID
        on_leak: "hold" puts the counterparty on hold in your mandates
                 (POST /canary/enforce-hook), "none" only records the event
        credential_type: the credential type, as in POST /credentials/issue

Input Schema

Name	Required	Default
`mode`	No	bound
`on_leak`	No	hold
`credential_type`	No	AgentTrustCredential
`counterparty_did`	Yes

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`result`	Yes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

AddedOct 20, 2026

TDQS

A4.3/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so richly: it states the leak-detection effect and signed leak event, the cost ('costs what a credential costs'), the authentication requirement (X-API-Key header), and the side effect of 'hold' mode putting the counterparty on hold. This is well beyond what a bare schema provides.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The purpose is front-loaded in the first sentence, and the structured Args section is easy to scan. There is minor redundancy ('for one counterparty: a credential to hand to that counterparty') and some verbosity, but the length is reasonable for the concept's complexity.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given a novel concept, zero schema descriptions, no annotations, and an output schema that handles return values, the description is complete enough to call the tool correctly. It covers prerequisites, all parameters, authentication, cost, and the leak-event outcome.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, and it does: counterparty_did is a registered unrevoked MolTrust agent DID, mode is explained as 'bound' vs 'decoy' with distinct presentation semantics, on_leak is explained as 'hold' vs 'none' with an endpoint reference, and credential_type is tied to the credential issuance model.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: 'Issue a leak canary for one counterparty: a credential to hand to that counterparty.' It clearly defines what a leak canary is and its effect. However, it does not explicitly distinguish itself from sibling tools like canary_list or canary_events, so sibling differentiation is only implied by the 'issue' action.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explains the purpose and prerequisites (API key, counterparty must be registered and unrevoked), which implies when the tool is useful. But it offers no explicit when-to-use guidance, no alternatives, and no exclusions relative to sibling tools like canary_list or canary_events.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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