Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries full behavioral burden and does so well. It discloses the stateful first-call baseline storage, later diff behavior (added/removed/modified), and compact risk hints, plus scope limits regarding public HTTPS endpoints.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is three sentences, front-loaded with the primary use case, then behavioral detail, then a caution. Every sentence earns its place with no fluff or repetition.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter tool with no output schema and no annotations, the description provides sufficient context: purpose, usage trigger, stateful behavior, result content, and exclusions. It is complete enough for an agent to correctly select and invoke the tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The single parameter endpoint_url has 100% schema description coverage ('Public HTTPS MCP endpoint that supports tools/list'), so the schema already explains the parameter. The description reinforces the public HTTPS constraint but adds no new parameter-specific syntax or format details.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool checks whether an MCP server's tool catalog changed, with a specific verb+resource ('check MCP tool-surface changes'). It distinguishes itself from siblings like check_url_changes by focusing on the MCP tools/list catalog rather than generic URL changes.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explicitly says when to use it ('when an agent depends on a remote public HTTPS MCP server and needs to know whether its tool catalog changed') and when not to ('Avoid for private/authenticated MCP endpoints or as a substitute for a full security audit'). It does not name an alternative tool explicitly, so it misses the full 5-point criteria.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.