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aml__aml

AML (Anti-Money Laundering) risk checks for addresses and transactions.

Actions: • verify-address: Check if a blockchain address is flagged or associated with fraud, sanctions, ransomware, exploits, darknet markets, or other AML risk categories. Returns risk score, risk band, and the flagging sources. • screen-transaction: Screen a transaction against AML data. Returns whether the transaction is flagged, its risk score/band, and the flagged participant addresses with their roles, scores, severities and categories. • get-address-exposure: Get an address's exposure to risky entities/categories across the AML exposure graph. Params: blockchain, address. Costs 200,000 credits per request. • list-address-exposure-paths: List the paths connecting an address to risky entities in the AML exposure graph. Params: blockchain, address; optional rootAddress (only return routes originating from this flagged root address), limit (1-50, defaults to 10), startingAfter (pagination cursor). Costs 100,000 credits per page - pass the response's next cursor back as startingAfter to fetch subsequent pages.

get-address-exposure and list-address-exposure-paths only support a subset of chains - see the blockchain parameter description.

Note: the credit cost of these endpoints is significant — see credits below.

Credits by action (source: OpenAPI): • get-address-exposure: 200000 • list-address-exposure-paths: 100000 • screen-transaction: 500000 • verify-address: 200000

Credits are indicative only and may change at any time. The actual credits spent for each API request are returned in the response headers.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNoNumber of exposure paths to return per page (1-50, defaults to 10) - applies to list-address-exposure-paths only
actionYesAction to perform
addressNoBlockchain address - required for verify-address, get-address-exposure, and list-address-exposure-paths
contextNoOptional context for the request - echoed back in response
blockchainNoBlockchain protocol - required for screen-transaction, get-address-exposure and list-address-exposure-paths. screen-transaction accepts: ethereum, ethereum-classic, binance-smart-chain, bitcoin, bitcoin-cash, dash, dogecoin, litecoin, arbitrum, polygon, avalanche, optimism, base, zcash, xrp, solana, tezos, kaspa, tron. get-address-exposure and list-address-exposure-paths accept only: ethereum, binance-smart-chain, ethereum-classic, polygon, tron, bitcoin, bitcoin-cash, litecoin, dogecoin, dash, zcash, xrp, solana
rootAddressNoOnly return routes that originate from this flagged root address (one of the roots[].rootAddress values returned by get-address-exposure) - optional, applies to list-address-exposure-paths only
startingAfterNoPagination cursor - pass the nextStartingAfter value from the previous response to fetch the next page; applies to list-address-exposure-paths only
transactionHashNoTransaction hash to screen against AML data - required for screen-transaction

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it discloses per-action credit costs (200k/100k/500k), the pagination contract (pass nextStartingAfter back as startingAfter), the limited chain support for exposure actions, and the caveat that costs are indicative and the real figure is in response headers. This is exactly the operational context an agent needs before invoking a costly call.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Well front-loaded with the action bullets followed by chain-support notes and a credit table. It loses a point for redundancy: the per-action credit costs appear both inside the action bullets and again in the separate 'Credits by action' section.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For an 8-parameter, no-output-schema, no-annotation multi-action tool, the description covers return shapes per action, cost, chain eligibility, and pagination mechanics. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it correctly appears to be missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents every parameter including enums, defaults, and the blockchain subset. The description largely restates those constraints rather than adding new semantics, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Each of the four actions is described with a specific verb and resource (verify-address checks flags, screen-transaction screens a tx, get-address-exposure returns graph exposure, list-address-exposure-paths lists routes), and the return payloads are enumerated per action. An agent can tell this AML tool apart from the address_history/address_latest siblings at a glance.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The action list implies when each action applies, and the description notes the chain-subset restriction for the two exposure actions, but it never states when to choose verify-address vs get-address-exposure (both risk-related) or when to prefer this tool over the sibling address tools. Usage is inferred rather than stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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