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Receiver identity check

wever_receiver-identity-check
Read-only

Agent Handoffs: submit a handoff addressing setup: the registered agents with each registry record and registered endpoint, and each handoff route with the agent it means to reach, how the sender addresses it (its registered name resolved through the registry, a fixed endpoint, discovery, the reply-to address in a message, or whichever endpoint answers), the address used, how the receiver’s identity is checked (against its registry record, by its signature, its credential or mutual TLS), when (before the task moves, after or never) and what the sender does on a mismatch. The signed report names every route where any endpoint that answers can receive the task (sent to whichever endpoint answers, unchecked, checked only after the task moves, or going ahead on a mismatch), then every receiver missing from the registry, every address its record does not list, every check that never consults the registry record and every mismatch that only warns, with the fix for each. This reads whether each handoff route checks its receiver against its registered record before work moves: one identity record’s own consistency is wever_agent-identity-check, whether a registry covers the fleet is wever_agent-registry-check and a buyer acting for a human principal is wever_delegated-identity-check. Verdict any_endpoint_receives, identity_gaps, identity_unverified or receiver_verified. POST /api/receiver-identity-check. Reads only the material in the call: no network request, fetch, money movement, message, sharing, configuration change or external write. Paid URL: 0.10 USDC per call on Base via x402 exact, with the shared 10 signed-wallet free calls per rolling 30 days. Bind X-Wever-Wallet-Proof to the exact JSON arguments and the tool route. Returns a report with an Ed25519 signed receipt. Contract: /api/agent-handoffs-contract. Human page: https://weverlabs.com/agent-handoffs/.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
labelNoOptional name recorded in the report.
routesYesEach handoff route with how its receiver is addressed and verified.
registryNoThe registered agents, each with its record and endpoints.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly, non-destructive, closed-world, but the description adds substantial context beyond them: the exact side-effect-free scope ('no network request, fetch, money movement, message, sharing, configuration change or external write'), the paid model (0.10 USDC via x402 exact on Base with 10 free signed-wallet calls per 30 days), the required X-Wever-Wallet-Proof binding to arguments and route, and the Ed25519 signed receipt. This is the kind of behavioral detail an agent needs before calling a metered endpoint.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The purpose and sibling routing are front-loaded, but the body is a single sprawling run-on sentence that re-lists every schema field option verbatim. It is dense and requires re-reading; several clauses could be cut without losing information an agent needs.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a metered, signed-report analysis tool with no output schema, the description covers what it computes, the four possible verdicts, what the report enumerates and fixes, the cost and auth requirements, the read-only guarantee, and links to the contract and human page. Nothing material is missing for correct invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents label, routes, registry and every nested enum. The description's prose enumeration of addressed_by, verified_by, verified_when and on_mismatch largely restates those schema descriptions rather than adding new meaning; the added value is mainly the interpretation of what a report will say about each route.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names the resource (handoff routes' receiver identity checking) and the specific analysis performed: reading whether each route checks its receiver against its registered record before work moves. It explicitly distinguishes itself from three siblings (wever_agent-identity-check for one record's consistency, wever_agent-registry-check for fleet coverage, wever_delegated-identity-check for human principals). The opening phrase 'submit a handoff addressing setup' is awkward and obscures the verb, which keeps it from a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Clear routing guidance: 'This reads whether each handoff route checks its receiver against its registered record before work moves' followed by explicit assignments of the adjacent scenarios to named sibling tools. What is missing is an explicit 'do not use when' for cases with no handoff routes at all, but the alternative-selection guidance is strong.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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