Skip to main content
Glama

Wever Labs Agent Products

by io.github.CodeWever
OverviewDiscussionsAdmin

Payment Authority Inspector

wever_payment-authority-inspector

Paid URL: 0.10 USDC per call on Base; 10 signed-wallet free calls shared over rolling 30 days. Read the backend 402 body for x402 terms. Read-only canonical Base USDC receipt inspection for the configured Wever recipient. Settlement evidence grants no mandate, resource permission or execution authority. Operating boundary: Direct access uses x402 Base USDC settlement or the verified-wallet free tier. Read-only canonical Base USDC receipt inspection for the configured Wever recipient. Settlement evidence grants no mandate, resource permission or execution authority. The API access fee is separate from any inspected payment or recorded invoice amount. POST /api/payment-authority-inspector. Existing product credentials, signed mandates, and single-use action grants remain required where applicable. This adapter grants no authority and never supplies server credentials. This current money service follows its published inspection, policy evaluation or private invoice contract. Payment is an API access fee and grants no spending authority.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
modeYes
payeeYes
payerYes
amount_atomicYes
transaction_hashYes
min_confirmationsYes
authorization_nonceYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed15 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Previous value: -trueNew value: +false
    • removedInput schema / description
      Removed value: -"The existing product POST body. Supply its documented mode, arguments, and required signed authority or grant. The product validates its full contract."
    • removedInput schema / maxProperties
      Removed value: -64
    • removedInput schema / minProperties
      Removed value: -1
    • addedInput schema / properties / amount_atomic
      Added value: +{
+  "pattern": "^(0|[1-9][0-9]{0,77})(?![\\s\\S])",
+  "type": "string"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / authorization_nonce
      Added value: +{
+  "pattern": "^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}(?![\\s\\S])",
+  "type": "string"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / min_confirmations
      Added value: +{
+  "maximum": 100,
+  "minimum": 2,
+  "type": "integer"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / mode / const
      Added value: +"inspect_base_usdc_settlement"
    • removedInput schema / properties / mode / maxLength
      Removed value: -128
    • removedInput schema / properties / mode / minLength
      Removed value: -1
    • removedInput schema / properties / mode / type
      Removed value: -"string"
    • addedInput schema / properties / payee
      Added value: +{
+  "pattern": "^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}(?![\\s\\S])",
+  "type": "string"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / payer
      Added value: +{
+  "pattern": "^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}(?![\\s\\S])",
+  "type": "string"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / transaction_hash
      Added value: +{
+  "pattern": "^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}(?![\\s\\S])",
+  "type": "string"
+}
    • addedInput schema / required
      Added value: +[
+  "mode",
+  "transaction_hash",
+  "payer",
+  "payee",
+  "amount_atomic",
+  "authorization_nonce",
+  "min_confirmations"
+]
  2. First observed

TDQS

C2.3/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations supply the safety profile (readOnlyHint=false, openWorldHint=true, destructiveHint=false, non-idempotent), and the description adds real context: the call is a paid settlement, the 402 body carries x402 terms, no server credentials are supplied, and settlement grants no spending authority. It does not, however, describe what a successful/failed inspection returns or what min_confirmations does at runtime, and the repeated 'read-only inspection' phrasing sits in tension with readOnlyHint=false (a payment transfer is a state change).

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness2/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences are duplicated verbatim ('Read-only canonical Base USDC receipt inspection for the configured Wever recipient' and 'Settlement evidence grants no mandate, resource permission or execution authority'), and a third concept (no spending authority) is restated three times. The task-relevant purpose sentence is not front-loaded; the opening sentence is about pricing.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 7-required-parameter, paid, open-world tool with no output schema, the description covers the commercial/authority boundary reasonably but leaves the entire parameter surface and the return payload unexplained. An agent cannot call this correctly from the description alone.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters1/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% across 7 required parameters (mode, transaction_hash, payer, payee, amount_atomic, authorization_nonce, min_confirmations). The description contributes nothing about any of them beyond hinting at a 'configured Wever recipient'; an agent must infer the atomic-amount format, nonce requirement, and confirmation floor entirely from regexes and bounds.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose3/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Buried in boilerplate, the operative phrase 'Read-only canonical Base USDC receipt inspection for the configured Wever recipient' does state a specific verb and resource, and the POST endpoint is named. However, nearly half the text is about payment terms and disclaimers rather than what the tool does, and no sibling (e.g. wever_receipt-passport, wever_x402-payment-gateway) is named to differentiate it. Purpose is inferable but not front-loaded or distinguishing.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explains how access is paid (0.10 USDC/call, free tier, 402 body) but never says when to choose this inspector over the many sibling rails (receipt-passport, x402-payment-gateway, proof-inbox). No preconditions beyond 'credentials remain required', and no exclusions or alternative-tool routing are given.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All Wever Labs Agent Products toolsInspect
Try in Browser
One endpoint for every MCP toolRayrun runs every MCP server behind one URL and holds the credentials. Each call is decided per client, tool, and argument, then recorded.ray.runAd

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources