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Limit evidence check

wever_limit-evidence-check
Read-only

Agent Limits: submit a system’s limit-event records (each block, escalation, queued action, near miss and override, with which limit it hit, what was attempted, the amount, when, what the system did, who was told and who wrote the record) and optionally the limits the system has. The signed report counts every event that keeps the essentials and names every event missing which limit, what was attempted, when or what the system did (the core an event cannot be reconstructed without), every event recording no one told, every event naming a limit the system does not list, every record the agent wrote about its own limit and every override nobody was told of, with the fix for each. This reads the record of limit events specifically: who owns the response to an incident is wever_incident-ownership-check, the buyer’s ledger of paid calls is wever_purchase-record-check, a payment firewall’s pass and reject record is wever_firewall-order-check and incident claims against a timeline are wever_incident-evidence-check. Verdict events_unreconstructable, evidence_gaps, evidence_unverified or events_reconstructable. POST /api/limit-evidence-check. Reads only the material in the call: no network request, fetch, money movement, message, sharing, configuration change or external write. Paid URL: 0.10 USDC per call on Base via x402 exact, with the shared 10 signed-wallet free calls per rolling 30 days. Bind X-Wever-Wallet-Proof to the exact JSON arguments and the tool route. Returns a report with an Ed25519 signed receipt. Contract: /api/agent-limits-contract. Human page: https://weverlabs.com/agent-limits/.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
labelNoOptional name recorded in the report.
eventsYesEach recorded limit event.
limitsNoThe limits the system has, by name.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations, the description discloses that the tool only reads material in the call (no network request, fetch, money movement, message, sharing, configuration change, or external write), which directly reinforces readOnlyHint and openWorldHint=false. It also covers cost (0.10 USDC per call on Base via x402 exact, 10 signed-wallet free calls per rolling 30 days), the X-Wever-Wallet-Proof binding to JSON arguments and route, and an Ed25519 signed receipt — the operational facts an agent needs before paying for a call.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose and sibling routing are front-loaded, which is good, but the middle sentence is a single dense run-on enumerating every finding type twice over ('counts every event that keeps the essentials and names every event missing…'), and the payment/receipt/contract detail stacks up at the end. It is informative but would read faster as a short bulleted breakdown.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a paid, nested-input compliance check with no output schema, the description supplies the verdict enumeration, report and receipt expectations, payment mechanics, proof-binding requirement, and links to the contract and human page. An agent has everything it needs to call this correctly on the first attempt.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With schema description coverage at 100%, the baseline would be 3, but the description explains what the record is expected to contain in narrative form — which limit it hit, what was attempted, the amount, when, what the system did, who was told and who wrote the record — plus the reconstruction principle defining the 'core' an event cannot be missing. That adds interpretable meaning beyond the field-level schema strings.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: submit a system's limit-event records and receive a signed report checking them, then names the exact verdicts (events_unreconstructable, evidence_gaps, evidence_unverified, events_reconstructable). It also distinguishes the tool from four siblings by domain (incident ownership, purchase records, firewall orders, incident evidence), so an agent can route correctly without opening another schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It clearly routes the agent: who owns the response to an incident goes to wever_incident-ownership-check, paid-call ledgers to wever_purchase-record-check, firewall pass/reject records to wever_firewall-order-check, and timeline claims to wever_incident-evidence-check. What is missing is an explicit 'when not to use this at all' case, such as an empty or trivial record, but the positive routing is unusually strong.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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