Aziel Runtime

Advanced: seal a session

runtime_session_close

DestructiveIdempotent

[advanced/internal] Seal a raw session so further exec or policy on that session_id is rejected. End of the raw lifecycle — not a LOCKSET seal and not a FragGate call. Use this when the user asked to close the session. Do not use it for ordinary completion, writing a ChainLock LOCKSET, or default product work; use leaving the session to TTL expire (6h), chainlock_seal for a lockset, or fraggate_call for new work instead. Destructive to further exec/policy on that session_id only (session_closed 409). Does not delete receipts. A second close does not reopen — it returns session_closed (409) while the session stays sealed. Missing session returns session_not_found. Prefer leaving sessions to expire unless asked. session_id or id (aliases) required. No force flag on the public tool — TTL expiry is the automatic close path. Mutation requires confirm=true (runtime gate) or dry_run=true (preview only, no write). confirm and dry_run stay optional on inputSchema.required. Returns sealed session status, close receipt, and verified.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`id`	No	Alias of session_id. The door accepts either key; do not send two different values.
`confirm`	No	Documented confirmation flag. Optional in inputSchema.required (connector refresh must not break). tools/call still refuses MCP-CONFIRM-REQUIRED when confirm is missing or false unless dry_run=true (preview, no write).
`dry_run`	No	Optional preview flag. When true, return a would-mutate preview and do not write. Alternative to confirm=true. Does not mutate.
`session_id`	Yes	Required. Raw session id from runtime_session_open (sess_ + 32 lowercase hex). Alias: id. Missing both fails with session_id required; unknown id returns session_not_found.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`code`	No	FragGate or fabric code when present: FG-OK, FG-HALLUC-TOOL, FG-STUB, FG-LOCAL-ONLY, FG-UNKNOWN-OP, FG-GATE-REFUSE, FG-LAMB-REFUSE, or a module refuse such as MESH-* / AKM-*.
`door`	No	Door name. The public door is fraggate.
`ran_in`	No	Execution locale (for example aziel-runtime) when present.
`result`	No	Close body: sealed session, close receipt, verified. Errors: session_id required, session_not_found, session_closed (already sealed; does not reopen).
`status`	No	HTTP-like status when present on wrappers (200 ok; 400+ error / refuse).
`display`	No	Human-facing envelope. Show title and summary, then take the next input.
`receipt`	No	Optional receipt, ledger tip, or TemporalLock/ForgeReceipts exit when the door stamped one.
`refusal`	No	Explicit refuse object, code, or message when the door or engine refused.
`engine_op`	No	Resolved engine op when present (often inside result).
`ledger_tip`	No	Ask/refuse ledger tip when the door stamped one.
`provenance`	No	Provenance / input packet when the pipeline attached one.
`session_id`	No	Raw session id when session plumbing was used. Hidden unless the user asked for the chain.
`engine_slug`	No	Resolved engine slug when present (often inside result).
`limitations`	No	Capability limitations or Remain-OFF notes when present.
`engine_digest`	No	64-hex engine_digest when a true in-process engine ran (often inside result).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedSep 24, 2026

TDQS

A5/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already indicate destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=true, and the description adds meaningful detail beyond that: destructive scope is limited to further exec/policy on that session_id only, receipts are not deleted, a second close returns session_closed (409) without reopening, missing sessions return session_not_found, and mutation requires confirm=true or dry_run=true. This enriches the agent's understanding of side effects and failure modes.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but each sentence earns its place by covering a distinct behavioral fact: scope, alternatives, destructiveness, idempotency, error cases, parameter aliases, and mutation gate. It is front-loaded with the core purpose and ends with return values. No filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The tool is advanced and mutation-heavy with aliases, confirmation flags, destructive effects, and idempotency edge cases. The description covers all of these and also states the return content ('sealed session status, close receipt, and verified'). Given the output schema exists, nothing essential is missing for an agent to select and invoke this correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, but the description adds critical semantics: session_id or id are aliases and must not be sent with two different values, extra keys are ignored, confirm and dry_run are optional in the schema but required for mutation, and dry_run is preview-only. It also explains the pattern and origin of session_id. This goes well beyond the schema text.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb ('Seal') and resource ('raw session'), and states the exact effect: further exec or policy on that session_id is rejected. It explicitly disambiguates from chainlock_seal and fraggate_call, so an agent can distinguish it from siblings without opening their schemas.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives explicit when-to-use ('when the user asked to close the session') and when-not-to-use ('ordinary completion, writing a ChainLock LOCKSET, or default product work'). It names concrete alternatives: TTL expiry, chainlock_seal, and fraggate_call. This fully routes the agent to the correct tool vs the sibling set.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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