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DropEngine x402 Agent Services

agent_permission_vault

Check whether an owner-configured policy authorizes this capability for the verified caller. Permission check only; agents cannot grant themselves permission. This is authorization, not action safety. Price: $0.001 USDC per call.

Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
scopeNodefault
contextNo
resourceNo*
operationYes
capabilityYes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
metaNo
nextNo
errorNo
resultNo
statusNo
paymentNo
successYes
agent_uxNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It discloses the crucial boundary that this is authorization not action safety and that agents cannot self-grant, plus the $0.001 USDC price and post-approval limits of the action gate. It doesn't explain the return payload, but an output schema exists.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness2/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is bloated: it embeds an entire multi-tool routing guide and a list of unrelated exclusions (payment, reputation, simulation) that belong in other tools' definitions. The core purpose is buried behind the operational preamble instead of being front-loaded content-wise.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Purpose, permissions boundary, and routing are covered, and an output schema exists so return values need no explanation. However the complete absence of parameter meaning documentation across 5 params is a real completeness gap for a callable contract.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% and the description never explains what 'operation', 'capability', 'resource', or 'scope' mean or how they relate. For a 5-parameter tool with a nested context object, the semantics are effectively undocumented, leaving the agent guessing at capability format and resource scoping.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening sentence states a specific verb (check) and resource (owner-configured policy authorization) for a verified caller. It distinguishes itself from the broader sibling preflight_action by clarifying it is a permission check, not an action safety assessment, though it doesn't compare to similarly-named siblings with the same precision.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The 'Agent entry points' section provides an explicit routing map with conditions selecting each alternative (risky action → Agent Action Gate; unclear provider → /api/discover; comparison → route_tool), and it clearly says agents cannot grant themselves permission. The guidance is rich but somewhat sprawling.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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