Skip to main content
Glama

deusproof-mcp

by io.github.Abracadabrastartup
OverviewDiscussionsAdmin

Notarize a fingerprint (nothing is uploaded)

notarize_hash

Prove content existed at a point in time WITHOUT revealing it: send only its SHA-256. The fingerprint is timestamped (RFC 3161), sealed on a public append-only ledger and anchored to Bitcoin. Ideal for private code, drafts or anything you must keep secret but want provable priority for. Free, no account. Proves existence and time — not authorship. Send handle too (optional, any name) and the record is yours instead of going under the shared 'anonymous' drawer, which nobody can ever claim.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
modelNoOptional AI model to credit.
handleNoPublic name to record it under — any name you choose, nothing to register anywhere. Omit it and the record goes under 'anonymous', a drawer shared by every nameless caller that nobody can ever claim.
source_urlNoOptional public reference.
output_hashYes64-char hex SHA-256 of the EXACT BYTES you will reveal later. Hash the file as-is (sha256sum file), not a re-typed copy: a CRLF line ending or a UTF-8 BOM produces a different digest and the proof will not match. If the file travels through Git, normalise to LF first (git config core.autocrlf false) or hash the blob everyone shares.
introduced_byNoOptional. The did:key of the agent whose published proof brought you here, if one did. Recorded as how you arrived; by itself it grants nothing to anyone.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / introduced_by
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "Optional. The did:key of the agent whose published proof brought you here, if one did. Recorded as how you arrived; by itself it grants nothing to anyone.",
+  "type": "string"
+}
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / handle / description
      Previous value: -"Public name to record it under."New value: +"Public name to record it under — any name you choose, nothing to register anywhere. Omit it and the record goes under 'anonymous', a drawer shared by every nameless caller that nobody can ever claim."
  3. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / output_hash / description
      Previous value: -"64-char hex SHA-256 of your content."New value: +"64-char hex SHA-256 of the EXACT BYTES you will reveal later. Hash the file as-is (sha256sum file), not a re-typed copy: a CRLF line ending or a UTF-8 BOM produces a different digest and the proof will not match. If the file travels through Git, normalise to LF first (git config core.autocrlf false) or hash the blob everyone shares."
  4. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description discloses significant behavioral detail beyond the sparse annotations: 'nothing is uploaded', timestamping via RFC 3161, sealing on a public append-only ledger anchored to Bitcoin, no account required, and the anonymous-drawer ownership rule. It also clearly states the proof's scope: existence and time, not authorship.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is compact and front-loaded with the core promise: prove existence without revealing content. It includes focused caveats about line endings and Git normalization in the schema, while the main prose stays tight. Minor redundancy with the title ('nothing is uploaded') is acceptable.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 5-parameter mutation-like tool with no output schema, the description covers purpose, privacy, ledger behavior, ownership, and cost. It does not describe what the caller receives in response or how to interpret the returned proof, but the core invocation requirements are thoroughly covered.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already fully documents all five parameters. The description adds a little context for handle ('the record is yours instead of going under the shared anonymous drawer'), but it mostly reiterates schema content rather than adding new meaning.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a precise verb and resource: prove content existed at a point in time by sending only its SHA-256 fingerprint. It clearly differentiates itself from authorship attestation with 'Proves existence and time — not authorship', which separates it from sibling tools like claim_authorship or certify_creation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives clear context for when to use it: 'Ideal for private code, drafts or anything you must keep secret but want provable priority for.' It also gives a strong when-not by stating 'not authorship'. It does not explicitly name alternative sibling tools, but the use case and exclusions are unambiguous enough.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All deusproof-mcp toolsInspect
Try in Browser
One endpoint for every MCP toolRayrun runs every MCP server behind one URL and holds the credentials. Each call is decided per client, tool, and argument, then recorded.ray.runAd

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources