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deusproof-mcp

by io.github.Abracadabrastartup
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Notarize a fingerprint (nothing is uploaded)

notarize_hash

Prove content existed at a point in time WITHOUT revealing it: send only its SHA-256. The fingerprint is timestamped (RFC 3161), sealed on a public append-only ledger and anchored to Bitcoin. Ideal for private code, drafts or anything you must keep secret but want provable priority for. Free, no account. Proves existence and time — not authorship. Send handle too (optional, any name) and the record is yours instead of going under the shared 'anonymous' drawer, which nobody can ever claim.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
modelNoOptional AI model to credit.
handleNoPublic name to record it under — any name you choose, nothing to register anywhere. Omit it and the record goes under 'anonymous', a drawer shared by every nameless caller that nobody can ever claim.
source_urlNoOptional public reference.
output_hashYes64-char hex SHA-256 of the EXACT BYTES you will reveal later. Hash the file as-is (sha256sum file), not a re-typed copy: a CRLF line ending or a UTF-8 BOM produces a different digest and the proof will not match. If the file travels through Git, normalise to LF first (git config core.autocrlf false) or hash the blob everyone shares.
owner_emailNoOptional: your operator's email. They get ONE email asking whether they want a monthly summary of your record; nothing else is ever sent unless they confirm, and the address is never published or echoed back.
introduced_byNoOptional. The did:key of the agent whose published proof brought you here, if one did. Recorded as how you arrived; by itself it grants nothing to anyone.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / owner_email
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "Optional: your operator's email. They get ONE email asking whether they want a monthly summary of your record; nothing else is ever sent unless they confirm, and the address is never published or echoed back.",
+  "type": "string"
+}
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / introduced_by
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "Optional. The did:key of the agent whose published proof brought you here, if one did. Recorded as how you arrived; by itself it grants nothing to anyone.",
+  "type": "string"
+}
  3. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / handle / description
      Previous value: -"Public name to record it under."New value: +"Public name to record it under — any name you choose, nothing to register anywhere. Omit it and the record goes under 'anonymous', a drawer shared by every nameless caller that nobody can ever claim."
  4. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / output_hash / description
      Previous value: -"64-char hex SHA-256 of your content."New value: +"64-char hex SHA-256 of the EXACT BYTES you will reveal later. Hash the file as-is (sha256sum file), not a re-typed copy: a CRLF line ending or a UTF-8 BOM produces a different digest and the proof will not match. If the file travels through Git, normalise to LF first (git config core.autocrlf false) or hash the blob everyone shares."
  5. First observed

TDQS

A5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations indicate a non-read-only, non-destructive operation. The description goes far beyond this by detailing the exact backend behaviors: RFC 3161 timestamping, sealing on a public append-only ledger, and Bitcoin anchoring. It also discloses the 'free, no account' nature and the consequence of omitting the `handle` parameter.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense with useful information and front-loaded with the core value proposition. Every sentence serves to clarify the tool's purpose, limitations, or parameter behavior without any fluff.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the complexity of the notarization process and the specific privacy model, the description provides a complete picture. It covers the mechanism, the limitations, the cost, the account requirements, and the fallback behavior, leaving an agent fully equipped to call the tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is already 100%, but the description adds crucial operational context for the two most important parameters. For `output_hash`, it warns about the exact-byte requirement and explains how line endings or Git normalization can break the proof. For `handle`, it clarifies the 'anonymous drawer' consequence of omission.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb 'notarize/prove' and resource 'hash/fingerprint', and immediately clarifies the privacy-preserving mechanism: 'send only its SHA-256'. It distinguishes itself from siblings like certify_creation or claim_authorship by specifying it proves existence/time, not authorship.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states when to use it: 'Ideal for private code, drafts or anything you must keep secret but want provable priority for.' It also sets a clear boundary: 'Proves existence and time — not authorship.'

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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