proofrelay.verify_signed_attestationVerify a legacy Ed25519 or V2 ES256 ProofRelay artifact using public key material and optional issuer/purpose pins. The tool never accepts private keys and does not sign caller claims.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| verification | Yes |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false. The description adds valuable security context beyond annotations: 'never accepts private keys and does not sign caller claims.' This informs the agent about operational boundaries, which is meaningful added context.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, ~30 words, front-loaded with the primary action. Every phrase earns its place — no filler or redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a verification tool with a single nested parameter, an output schema, and rich annotations, the description covers the essential context well. It could mention validation edge cases (e.g., which key format to prefer when both are present), but nothing critical is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
With 0% schema description coverage, the description compensates by clarifying parameter groups: 'public key material' maps to public_jwk/public_key_hex, 'pins' maps to expected_issuer/expected_purpose, and 'artifact' maps to signed_artifact. The now/now_ms params remain unexplained, but the most important semantics are captured.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb+resource structure ('Verify a legacy Ed25519 or V2 ES256 ProofRelay artifact') and adds scoping ('using public key material and optional issuer/purpose pins') that differentiates it from siblings like verify_bundle. The version qualifiers ('legacy', 'V2') give concrete operational specificity.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage is implied through the 'Verify' verb and algorithm details, but there's no explicit when-to-use-versus-alternatives guidance (e.g., no comparison to verify_bundle). The second sentence hints at security-relevant non-behavior but doesn't direct tool selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
All 26 tools have distinct names that clearly indicate their purpose (e.g., adapt_agent_identity_evidence vs. build_audit_pack_manifest). No two tools have overlapping or ambiguous functions, even though some share similar verbs; the nouns and description contexts differentiate them effectively.
The tool names follow a uniform convention: all start with 'proofrelay.' and use lowercase verb_noun with underscores (e.g., proofrelay.build_bundle_draft, proofrelay.verify_signed_attestation). There is no mixing of camelCase, across the entire set.
The server exposes 26 tools, which exceeds the 'borderline' range of 16–25 and falls into the 'too many' category (>25). While the tools cover a broad domain (evidence verification, risk scanning, etc.), the large number might overwhelm agents and suggests that some tools could be merged or the scope narrowed.
The tool set covers a comprehensive range of operations—adapting, building, verifying, scanning, recommending, and summarizing—across multiple subdomains (identity, payment, audit, etc.). Minor gaps exist, such as missing tools for updating or deleting evidence, but overall the surface appears very complete for the described functionality.