proofrelay.summarize_agent_action_logSummarize public-safe agent action log counts and hashes into a governance review profile without ingesting raw logs or traces.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_log | Yes |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false, so the barrier is low. The description adds valuable transparency by emphasizing it does not ingest raw logs or traces, which reassures the agent about privacy and scope. It does not contradict annotations, and the addition of 'public-safe' clarifies the security posture.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, well-formed sentence that is front-loaded with the primary action and includes a crucial negative ('without ingesting raw logs or traces'). No wasted words; every clause adds meaning.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool is relatively simple with one parameter and an output schema, and annotations cover safety aspects. The description is sufficient for basic usage, but given the nested object schema and the governance context, a bit more detail on expected inputs or output format would be helpful. Yet the output schema may compensate.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
With schema description coverage at 0%, the description must compensate, and it partially does by conveying the 'action_log' parameter contains counts and hashes. However, it does not elaborate on individual nested fields like 'log_hash' or 'action_type_counts', relying on the schema for structure. This is acceptable given the single parameter and clear high-level intent.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose: summarizing 'public-safe agent action log counts and hashes' into a 'governance review profile' while explicitly noting it does not ingest raw logs or traces. This distinguishes it from sibling tools that build evidence or proofs, and uses specific verbs and resources.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage for governance review without needing to process raw logs, which provides clear context. However, it does not explicitly state when not to use this tool or mention alternatives, though the sibling list suggests related but distinct tools like 'build_audit_pack_manifest' or 'build_closing_proof_pack'.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
All 26 tools have distinct names that clearly indicate their purpose (e.g., adapt_agent_identity_evidence vs. build_audit_pack_manifest). No two tools have overlapping or ambiguous functions, even though some share similar verbs; the nouns and description contexts differentiate them effectively.
The tool names follow a uniform convention: all start with 'proofrelay.' and use lowercase verb_noun with underscores (e.g., proofrelay.build_bundle_draft, proofrelay.verify_signed_attestation). There is no mixing of camelCase, across the entire set.
The server exposes 26 tools, which exceeds the 'borderline' range of 16–25 and falls into the 'too many' category (>25). While the tools cover a broad domain (evidence verification, risk scanning, etc.), the large number might overwhelm agents and suggests that some tools could be merged or the scope narrowed.
The tool set covers a comprehensive range of operations—adapting, building, verifying, scanning, recommending, and summarizing—across multiple subdomains (identity, payment, audit, etc.). Minor gaps exist, such as missing tools for updating or deleting evidence, but overall the surface appears very complete for the described functionality.