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GENESIS ProofRelay MCP Verifier

Scan MCP risk metadata

proofrelay.scan_mcp_risk
Read-onlyIdempotent

Return a read-only, public-metadata MCP risk score from tool descriptors, schemas, and registry claims. Use before listing, integrating, or wrapping another MCP server; it does not fetch network data, require auth, mutate systems, inspect source code, or certify vulnerability status.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
risk_scanYes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / risk_scan / properties / server_name / anyOf
      Previous value: -[
      -  {
      -    "type": "string"
      -  },
      -  {
      -    "type": "null"
      -  }
      -]New value: +[
      +  {
      +    "maxLength": 512,
      +    "type": "string"
      +  },
      +  {
      +    "type": "null"
      +  }
      +]
    • addedInput schema / properties / risk_scan / properties / tools / maxItems
      Added value: +128
  2. Changed5 schema fields changed
    • removedInput schema / $defs
      Removed value: -{
      -  "MCPRiskScanInput": {
      -    "description": "Public MCP descriptor or tool metadata for lightweight risk scanning.",
      -    "properties": {
      -      "declared_read_only": {
      -        "default": false,
      -        "description": "Whether the server claims read-only behavior.",
      -        "title": "Declared Read Only",
      -        "type": "boolean"
      -      },
      -      "payment_or_entitlement_required": {
      -        "default": false,
      -        "description": "Whether paid access is expected.",
      -        "title": "Payment Or Entitlement Required",
      -        "type": "boolean"
      -      },
      -      "requires_authentication": {
      -        "default": false,
      -        "description": "Whether the server requires user authentication.",
      -        "title": "Requires Authentication",
      -        "type": "boolean"
      -      },
      -      "server_name": {
      -        "anyOf": [
      -          {
      -            "type": "string"
      -          },
      -          {
      -            "type": "null"
      -          }
      -        ],
      -        "default": null,
      -        "description": "Public MCP server name.",
      -        "title": "Server Name"
      -      },
      -      "tools": {
      -        "description": "Public tool descriptors, schemas, and descriptions only.",
      -        "items": {
      -          "additionalProperties": true,
      -          "type": "object"
      -        },
      -        "title": "Tools",
      -        "type": "array"
      -      }
      -    },
      -    "title": "MCPRiskScanInput",
      -    "type": "object"
      -  }
      -}
    • removedInput schema / properties / risk_scan / $ref
      Removed value: -"#/$defs/MCPRiskScanInput"
    • addedInput schema / properties / risk_scan / properties
      Added value: +{
      +  "declared_read_only": {
      +    "type": "boolean"
      +  },
      +  "payment_or_entitlement_required": {
      +    "type": "boolean"
      +  },
      +  "requires_authentication": {
      +    "type": "boolean"
      +  },
      +  "server_name": {
      +    "anyOf": [
      +      {
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      {
      +        "type": "null"
      +      }
      +    ]
      +  },
      +  "tools": {
      +    "items": {
      +      "additionalProperties": true,
      +      "type": "object"
      +    },
      +    "type": "array"
      +  }
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / risk_scan / type
      Added value: +"object"
    • removedInput schema / title
      Removed value: -"scan_mcp_riskArguments"
  3. First observed

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare the operation is read-only and idempotent, and the description adds valuable behavioral detail beyond that: it operates only on public metadata, makes no network calls, requires no auth, and does not inspect source code or certify vulnerabilities. No contradiction with annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tight sentences: the first states the core function and source, the second gives usage timing and explicit non-behaviors. Every clause earns its place and the most decision-relevant information is front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description covers purpose, usage context, and behavioral constraints, and an output schema exists so return values need not be spelled out. The only notable gap is the undocumented nested input object, which weakens invocation readiness but not tool selection.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description carries the burden for explaining inputs, but it only loosely references 'tool descriptors, schemas, and registry claims.' It never explains the required `risk_scan` object or its nested fields, leaving the agent to infer meaning from property names alone.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb ('Return'), a concrete resource ('MCP risk score'), and the data sources ('tool descriptors, schemas, and registry claims'). It clearly distinguishes this from the sibling tools by framing it as a read-only metadata-based risk score.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly says when to use it ('Before listing, integrating, or wrapping another MCP server') and provides concrete exclusions ('does not fetch network data, require auth, mutate systems, inspect source code, or certify vulnerability status'). This gives an agent clear go/no-go guidance even without naming an alternative tool.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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