proofrelay.build_closing_proof_packBuild a hash-only closing proof pack manifest from settlement, title, lender, funding, notary, disbursement, and approval hashes. The tool does not authorize closing or disbursement.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| closing_pack | Yes |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnly and idempotent hints, which are consistent with the description's 'hash-only' and non-authorizing nature. The description adds valuable context by explicitly stating the tool does not authorize closing or disbursement, which is a behavioral constraint not conveyed by annotations alone. It also clarifies that the tool works only with hashes, not actual documents, providing extra transparency beyond structured fields.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, tightly packed. The first sentence identifies the purpose and scope, and the second provides a critical caveat about what the tool does not do. Every word earns its place, and there is no redundant or filler language.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity (nested object with multiple optional fields) and the presence of an output schema (which likely describes the returned manifest), the description covers the essential inputs and the tool's non-authorizing behavior. It lists all hash categories and explicitly says it is hash-only. Minor omissions include the format of hash values and the meaning of non_secret_refs, but these are partially addressed by the schema and do not severely hinder correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Though the schema description coverage is 0%, the description compensates by enumerating all the hash categories (settlement, title, lender, funding, notary, disbursement, approval) that correspond to the nested closing_pack fields. This gives semantic meaning beyond the bare schema definitions, though it doesn't explain non_secret_refs or the structure of closing_pack itself. Since the schema is rich and nested, the description's enumeration of hash types adds significant value.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose: to build a hash-only closing proof pack manifest from a specific set of hash categories (settlement, title, lender, funding, notary, disbursement, approval). It also explicitly notes what it does not do (authorize closing or disbursement), distinguishing it from potential sibling tools like build_audit_pack_manifest or build_bundle_draft.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies the tool is used when you need to assemble a closing proof pack from hashes, and it clarifies it does not authorize actions. However, it does not explicitly state when to use this tool versus alternatives like build_audit_pack_manifest or other build_* siblings, nor does it mention any prerequisites or exclusions beyond the authorization caveat.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
All 26 tools have distinct names that clearly indicate their purpose (e.g., adapt_agent_identity_evidence vs. build_audit_pack_manifest). No two tools have overlapping or ambiguous functions, even though some share similar verbs; the nouns and description contexts differentiate them effectively.
The tool names follow a uniform convention: all start with 'proofrelay.' and use lowercase verb_noun with underscores (e.g., proofrelay.build_bundle_draft, proofrelay.verify_signed_attestation). There is no mixing of camelCase, across the entire set.
The server exposes 26 tools, which exceeds the 'borderline' range of 16–25 and falls into the 'too many' category (>25). While the tools cover a broad domain (evidence verification, risk scanning, etc.), the large number might overwhelm agents and suggests that some tools could be merged or the scope narrowed.
The tool set covers a comprehensive range of operations—adapting, building, verifying, scanning, recommending, and summarizing—across multiple subdomains (identity, payment, audit, etc.). Minor gaps exist, such as missing tools for updating or deleting evidence, but overall the surface appears very complete for the described functionality.