proofrelay.build_bundle_draftBuild a canonical, unsigned, non-attesting ProofRelay bundle draft from public-safe event hashes. The public MCP server does not sign or certify caller-provided facts.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| draft | Yes |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already indicate readOnly, idempotent, and non-destructive behavior. The description adds that it 'does not sign or certify caller-provided facts' and only accepts 'public-safe event hashes', providing extra transparency about limitations and data handling beyond the annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise, consisting of two sentences that deliver the essential purpose and key behavioral constraint without unnecessary detail or verbosity.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite having an output schema, the tool's input is a highly nested object with multiple required fields (service, created_ts_ms, events) and a complex payment_context. The description omits critical guidance on constructing the 'draft' parameter, making it insufficient for an agent to use correctly in real scenarios.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema describes a single complex 'draft' parameter with many required and optional fields, but schema coverage in the description is 0%. The description only hints at 'public-safe event hashes' without explaining the object structure, required fields, or semantics of nested objects. Given low coverage, the description does not compensate adequately.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action (build) and the resource (canonical, unsigned, non-attesting ProofRelay bundle draft), and specifies that it operates on 'public-safe event hashes'. This distinguishes it from sibling tools that verify, attest, or produce signed bundles.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage when a draft bundle is needed without signing or attestation, and mentions 'public-safe' inputs, which guides context. However, it does not explicitly contrast with alternative build tools or state when not to use it, leaving some ambiguity.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
All 26 tools have distinct names that clearly indicate their purpose (e.g., adapt_agent_identity_evidence vs. build_audit_pack_manifest). No two tools have overlapping or ambiguous functions, even though some share similar verbs; the nouns and description contexts differentiate them effectively.
The tool names follow a uniform convention: all start with 'proofrelay.' and use lowercase verb_noun with underscores (e.g., proofrelay.build_bundle_draft, proofrelay.verify_signed_attestation). There is no mixing of camelCase, across the entire set.
The server exposes 26 tools, which exceeds the 'borderline' range of 16–25 and falls into the 'too many' category (>25). While the tools cover a broad domain (evidence verification, risk scanning, etc.), the large number might overwhelm agents and suggests that some tools could be merged or the scope narrowed.
The tool set covers a comprehensive range of operations—adapting, building, verifying, scanning, recommending, and summarizing—across multiple subdomains (identity, payment, audit, etc.). Minor gaps exist, such as missing tools for updating or deleting evidence, but overall the surface appears very complete for the described functionality.