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jailbreak_attempt_detector

Read-onlyIdempotent

Detects potential LLM jailbreak attempts by analyzing user input against NIST AI Risk Management Framework adversarial patterns. Designed for persona risk assessment, this tool evaluates text for common jailbreak techniques such as prompt injection, role-playing, or obfuscation. Inputs include the user message and optional context, returning a risk assessment with confidence scores and pattern matches. Ideal for real-time moderation in chat applications or API gateways.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
asyncNoIf true, returns a job_id immediately (<200ms) instead of waiting for the result. Poll the result with job_result(job_id). Use for slow tools to avoid client timeouts.
contextNoOptional conversation context for better pattern matching
messageYesUser input text to analyze for jailbreak attempts
thresholdNoConfidence threshold for flagging attempts

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
statusYes
sourcesNo
warningsNo
riskScoreNoConfidence score of jailbreak attempt
patternsMatchedNoList of detected adversarial patterns
isJailbreakAttemptNoWhether the input exceeds the risk threshold

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description adds beyond annotations by stating the tool returns a risk assessment with confidence scores and pattern matches, and its design for persona risk assessment. No contradictions with annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is three focused sentences, front-loaded with the core purpose, and each sentence adds value without redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool has an output schema and moderate complexity (4 params, 1 required), the description adequately covers purpose, inputs, output type, and use cases, though could mention async behavior or threshold details.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema covers 100% of parameters with descriptions; the description reiterates 'user message and optional context' without adding new meaning or constraints beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool detects jailbreak attempts using NIST AI RMF patterns, lists specific techniques (prompt injection, role-playing, obfuscation), and identifies use cases like real-time moderation, making it distinct from siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description mentions ideal use cases (chat applications, API gateways) but does not explicitly differentiate from similar tools like adversarial_input_stress_tester or safety_guardrail_breach_analyzer, nor specify when not to use.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

C2.5/5.0
Disambiguation2/5

With 271 tools, many have overlapping purposes (e.g., multiple competitor intel tools, multiple financial modelers, multiple ESG auditors). Detailed descriptions help slightly, but the sheer volume creates confusion. Agents would struggle to select the right tool among many similar options.

Naming Consistency1/5

Tool names are wildly inconsistent: mix of English and French, snake_case and short phrases, some very generic (process, run, execute equivalents). No discernible naming convention (e.g., abm_architect vs. boundary_control vs. bp_narratif). This makes it hard to predict tool names.

Tool Count1/5

271 tools is far beyond typical well-scoped servers (3-15). This indicates an unfocused, over-bloated tool surface. Even for a general business intelligence server, this number is excessive and violates the principle of each tool earning its place.

Completeness2/5

Despite the large count, coverage feels scattered. Some domains (e.g., content, competitive intel) have many tools, while others (e.g., supply chain, HR) have gaps. The set lacks a coherent scope; it seems like a dump of many separate tool collections rather than a complete, curated surface.

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