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jailbreak_attempt_detector

Read-onlyIdempotent

Detects potential LLM jailbreak attempts by analyzing user input against NIST AI Risk Management Framework adversarial patterns. Designed for persona risk assessment, this tool evaluates text for common jailbreak techniques such as prompt injection, role-playing, or obfuscation. Inputs include the user message and optional context, returning a risk assessment with confidence scores and pattern matches. Ideal for real-time moderation in chat applications or API gateways.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
asyncNoIf true, returns a job_id immediately (<200ms) instead of waiting for the result. Poll the result with job_result(job_id). Use for slow tools to avoid client timeouts.
contextNoOptional conversation context for better pattern matching
messageYesUser input text to analyze for jailbreak attempts
thresholdNoConfidence threshold for flagging attempts

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
statusYes
sourcesNo
warningsNo
riskScoreNoConfidence score of jailbreak attempt
patternsMatchedNoList of detected adversarial patterns
isJailbreakAttemptNoWhether the input exceeds the risk threshold

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already provide readOnlyHint, openWorldHint, and idempotentHint. The description adds insight into the tool's detection logic (techniques like prompt injection, role-playing, obfuscation) and output structure (risk assessment with confidence scores and pattern matches), which goes beyond the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a compact 3-sentence paragraph. Each sentence adds value: purpose, techniques/design, and usage/output. Some repetition of schema details (e.g., 'message and optional context') exists but is not excessive.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's moderate complexity, the description covers purpose, usage, and output. Annotations cover safety characteristics, and an output schema exists, so the description need not explain return values in depth. It sufficiently enables correct selection and invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description only restates that inputs include message and optional context, adding no extra detail beyond what the schema already provides for parameters like threshold and async.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states a specific verb ('detects') and resource ('potential LLM jailbreak attempts'), and adds detail about analyzing against NIST AI RMF adversarial patterns and common techniques. It does not explicitly distinguish from sibling tools like adversarial_input_stress_tester, but the focus on 'jailbreak' and 'persona risk assessment' is clear.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides clear use context: 'Designed for persona risk assessment' and 'Ideal for real-time moderation in chat applications or API gateways.' However, it does not mention when not to use it or explicitly name alternative tools for different scenarios.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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