EchelonGraph CVE & Exposure

CVE weakness, exploits and packages

cve_intel

Read-onlyIdempotent

Weakness, public exploit code, affected packages and fixed versions for one CVE, from EchelonGraph's per-CVE enrichment. Returns cwes (each cwe_id with its name and source), exploits (each with kind, source_name, source_url, first_seen_at and verified_status; at most 10, verified first) with exploits_total (every reference on record), exploits_capped (true when exploits lists fewer than exploits_total), exploits_by_kind and exploits_by_status, affected_packages (ecosystem, package_name, version_range, fixed_version), fixed_versions (ecosystem, package_name, vulnerable_range, fixed_version) and timeline (the newest enrichment-history rows, with timeline_total). verified_status is the label stored with each reference: verified for a Metasploit module, for an Exploit-DB entry Exploit-DB marks verified, and for curated seed rows marked so; reported for a public artefact nothing has confirmed works (nuclei templates, GitHub proofs of concept, unverified Exploit-DB entries); unconfirmed where a curated row says so. It is a label from the source, not a guarantee that the exploit works against a given system. An empty exploits list is not evidence that no public exploit exists: it covers only the sources EchelonGraph ingests, and which of them are polled depends on the deployment. A section the API could not read is named in coverage.sections_failed and left out of data, never relayed as an empty list. Vendor advisories, patches, generated summaries, trending signals and historical incidents are not relayed. Pass a CVE ID like CVE-2021-44228. Its structured result carries state (measured), measured_at (null: each row carries its own time), method, coverage (the sections relayed, failed and left out, and per-list counts), freshness (null) and notes, with data, which the first text block holds whole up to 30,000 characters; the result's last text block repeats it without data and without the note's sentences (the text block before it), with which notes ends. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`cve_id`	Yes	a CVE ID, e.g. CVE-2021-44228

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 4, 2026

TDQS

A3.9/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, openWorld), and the description goes well beyond them: it defines verified_status semantics, the exploits cap (10, verified first) with exploits_total/exploits_capped, the deployment-dependent source coverage, the coverage.sections_failed failure mode, and the truncation contract at 30,000 characters. This is unusually rich behavioral disclosure.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness2/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose is front-loaded, but the bulk of the text is a dense, single-paragraph exposition of return-value structure (state, measured_at, coverage, freshness, notes, data, first/last text blocks, TEXT CUT behavior). Since an output schema exists, most of that detail is redundant here, making the description oversized for what it must convey.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a per-CVE enrichment tool with an output schema already present, the description covers the non-obvious gaps an agent would otherwise miss: source-deployment-dependent coverage, the failed-section failure mode, verified_status interpretation and the truncation limit. Nothing essential to calling it correctly is absent, though the sibling-routing guidance remains implicit.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single required parameter with 100% schema description coverage, so the schema carries the semantics. The description only repeats the format example (CVE-2021-44228) already present in the schema and adds no validation or formatting rules. Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening sentence names a concrete resource and scope: weakness, exploits, affected packages and fixed versions for ONE CVE, sourced from EchelonGraph enrichment. It further delineates by enumerating what is NOT relayed (vendor advisories, patches, summaries, trending, incidents), which separates it from sibling get_vendor_advisory and cve_summary even without naming them. It stops short of naming a sibling explicitly, so a 4 rather than 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage context is clear: pass a CVE ID like CVE-2021-44228, and the exclusion list tells the agent to route elsewhere for advisories, summaries, trending or incidents. It also warns that an empty exploits list is not proof of no exploit and that coverage.sections_failed must be checked, which shapes correct use. No explicit when-not-to-use statement naming alternatives, so 4.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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