DebitMyData Agentic Superhighway

List a DID-LLM in the directory

dmd_list_in_directory

Two calls, signed by the DID-LLM's owner. Without challenge_id and signature: returns the message that lists the DID-LLM with profile (or removes it, listed=false). Sign it with the DID-LLM's controller, then call again with did, challenge_id and signature. A wrong signature uses up the message.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "did": "<did>"
    },
    "name": "dmd_list_in_directory"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`did`	Yes	The DID-LLM (did:web:...:agents:...) or its identity ID (dmd_identity_...)
`listed`	No	false: remove the DID-LLM from the directory
`profile`	No	When listing: entity_type (avatar, robot or sentient), specialty (3-120 characters), description (20-700 characters, 100 words at most); optional owner_name, region, country, created_on (YYYY-MM-DD). Public, plain text, no links.
`signature`	No	Signature of the message, as for dmd_prove_wallet_control
`challenge_id`	No	Leave empty to get the message to sign
`controller_type`	No	Who signs: ed25519 (the key, by default) or eip155 (the wallet)

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedNov 13, 2026

TDQS

A3.9/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare readOnly=false, destructive=false, openWorld=false; the description adds real behavior the annotations don't: a signed two-step challenge flow, one-shot consumption of the challenge on a bad signature, and that `profile` becomes public plain-text data. The `listed=false` removal path sits in some tension with destructiveHint=false, though re-listing with the same tool appears to make it recoverable, so this reads as a nuance rather than a contradiction.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is short, but the structure is tangled: "Two calls" is ambiguous (two invocations of this one tool), and the core purpose is buried in the second clause of the first sentence. Front-loading what the tool does, then the two-step flow, would cost no extra words.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present and full schema descriptions, the agent has what it needs to execute the challenge/sign/re-call sequence. Minor gaps remain: whether removal via `listed=false` is reversible, and no guidance on when the controller_type should be ed25519 versus eip155 beyond the schema text.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the field-level meaning (profile fields, signature, challenge_id, controller_type) is already documented. The description still adds value by tying parameters to the protocol: which fields are omitted on the first call and which are supplied on the signed second call, plus what `listed=false` actually does.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names the concrete operation: it returns the message that lists the DID-LLM with a `profile`, or removes it when `listed=false`. The verb and resource are specific, but the opening sentence ("Two calls, signed by the DID-LLM's owner") is protocol framing rather than purpose, and no sibling such as dmd_search_directory is contrasted.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It lays out the call sequence explicitly: first call without challenge_id/signature to obtain the message, sign it as the DID-LLM's controller, then call again with did, challenge_id and signature. It also warns that a wrong signature consumes the message. What's missing is when to choose this over directory-search or listing alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All DebitMyData Agentic Superhighway tools Inspect

Try in Browser

One endpoint for every MCP toolRayrun runs every MCP server behind one URL and holds the credentials. Each call is decided per client, tool, and argument, then recorded.ray.runAd

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.