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Daski

daski_revoke_delivery_confirmation

Destructive

Prepare, submit, or check withdrawal of the payer's current delivery confirmation. The request carries phase (prepare, submit, or check) and submission (sponsored for a plain wallet: Daski relays the signed EAS attestation; direct for a contract wallet: prepare returns the validated call the wallet's own tool sends). Call once without authorization for an order-action challenge, then retry with a fresh payer authorization.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
requestNo
orderHandleYes
authorizationNo

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false, and openWorldHint=true, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely non-derivable behavior: the two-step challenge/retry authorization handshake and the difference between relayed EAS attestation and a wallet-issued validated call. It does not restate the destructive or non-idempotent nature, which would have been useful for a withdrawal operation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the operation and then the request-shape detail, with no filler. The parenthetical enumerations are dense but each clause carries information. Slightly heavy nesting inside the second sentence keeps it from a 5.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, and the description covers the multi-phase flow and the auth handshake adequately for a complex, nested-parameter tool. It omits any mention of irreversibility or repeated-call behavior, which matters for a destructive, non-idempotent operation with a 0%-documented schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% and one parameter (request) is an opaque free-form object, so the description must carry the load. It partially does: it explains that 'request' carries phase (prepare/submit/check) and submission (sponsored/direct), which the schema cannot convey. However, orderHandle and the nine-field authorization object receive no explanation, so the coverage gap is only partly closed.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific resource (the payer's current delivery confirmation) and three concrete operations (prepare/submit/check withdrawal), so the agent knows exactly what the tool manipulates. It does not explicitly differentiate itself from the adjacent sibling daski_confirm_delivery, which is the most likely confusion point, so it falls short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives concrete when-to-use guidance: which phase value maps to which intent, and when to choose 'sponsored' vs 'direct' submission. It also states the auth flow explicitly ('call once without authorization for an order-action challenge, then retry with a fresh payer authorization'). It never says when NOT to use this tool or which sibling handles the non-withdrawal path.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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