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Daski

daski_confirm_delivery

Destructive

Prepare, submit, or check a payer-signed delivery confirmation. The request carries phase (prepare, submit, or check) and submission (sponsored for a plain wallet: Daski relays the signed EAS attestation; direct for a contract wallet: prepare returns the validated call the wallet's own tool sends). Call once without authorization for an order-action challenge, then retry with a fresh payer authorization.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
requestNo
orderHandleYes
authorizationNo

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false and openWorldHint=true, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds real context beyond that: the challenge/retry authorization handshake and the relay-vs-direct semantics of the EAS attestation. It stops short of saying which phase is destructive or that submit is irreversible, leaving some ambiguity.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the purpose, and every sentence carries content about modes or the auth flow. The middle sentence is dense and slightly hard to parse on first read, but there is no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists so return values need not be described, and annotations carry the safety profile. Given a mutation tool with a nested auth object, the description covers the essential invocation flow and the prepare/submit/check distinction; only the authorization payload and the exact destructive consequence remain unaddressed.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0% and the `request` object is opaque (additionalProperties: {}), so the description's note that the request carries `phase` and `submission` adds genuine meaning the schema cannot. However, the entire nine-field `authorization` object and `orderHandle` are undocumented anywhere, so the description only partially compensates.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names a specific resource (payer-signed delivery confirmation) and enumerates the three modes it serves (prepare/submit/check), which is enough to distinguish it from siblings like daski_revoke_delivery_confirmation. It does not explicitly contrast itself with those siblings, so it stops short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives concrete operational routing — when to use sponsored vs direct submission based on wallet type — and states the non-obvious invocation flow: call once unauthorized to get an order-action challenge, then retry with a fresh payer authorization. No explicit 'do not use this when...' or sibling alternative is offered, so not a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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